Port Security Frontline

Spending DA 1NC

**U.S. growth is slow but still increasing- turn around still possible**

Norris, chief financial correspondent at NY times, 6/15/12 (Floyd, “A Slow Recovery in the United States, but It’s All Relative”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/business/economy/a-slow-recovery-but-its-all-relative.html>, NYtimes)

THE slow pace of the American economic recovery seems likely to be a major issue in this year’s presidential election. But by the standards of other developed countries, the United States has done rather well since the credit crisis blossomed in 2008 and sent the world into recession. The American economy, adjusted for inflation, was 1.2 percent larger in the first quarter of this year than it was in the peak quarter before the recession. As the accompanying charts show, only Canada among the Group of 7 industrialized economies has done better. It has benefited from being an exporter of natural resources that China needs, but it also escaped the worst of the downturn because its banks, better regulated than those in this country, did not finance a real estate bubble during the boom. Even Canada, however, had one quarter last year when its economy declined. The charts show the performance of the Group of 7 nations, including three members of the euro zone, and that of seven other countries that use the euro. Of the 14, the United States is the only one to show consistent growth over the most recent four quarters. It has reported a growing economy for 11 consecutive quarters, even if the pace of growth has not been very fast.

Government spending is economically destructive

Mitchell, ‘05

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A growing government is contrary to America’s economic interests because the various methods of financing government—taxes, borrowing, and printing money—have harmful effects. This is also true because government spending by its very nature is often economically destructive, regardless of how it is financed. The many reasons for the negative relationship between the size of government and economic growth include: • The extraction cost. Government spending requires costly financing choices. The federal government cannot spend money without first taking that money from someone. All of the options used to finance government spending have adverse consequences. •The displacement cost. Government spending displaces private-sector activity. Every dollar that the government spends means one less dollar in the productive sector of the economy. This dampens growth since economic forces guide the allocation of resources in the private sector. • The negative multiplier cost. Government spending finances harmful intervention. Portions of the federal budget are used to finance activities that generate a distinctly negative effect on economic activity. For instance, many regulatory agencies have comparatively small budgets, but they impose large costs on the economy’s productive sector. • The behavioral subsidy cost. Government spending encourages destructive choices. Many government programs subsidize economically undesirable decisions. Welfare encourages people to choose leisure. Unemployment insurance programs provide an incentive to remain unemployed. • The behavioral penalty cost. Government spending discourages productive choices. Government programs often discourage economically desirable decisions. Saving is important to help provide capital for new investment, yet the incentive to save has been undermined by government programs that subsidize retirement, housing, and education. • The market distortion cost. Government spending hinders resource allocation. Competitive markets determine prices in a process that ensures the most efficient allocation of resources. However, in both health care and education, government subsidies to reduce out-of-pocket expenses have created a “third-party payer” problem. • The inefficiency cost. Government spending is a less effective way to deliver services. Government directly provides many services and activities such as education, airports, and postal operations. However, there is considerable evidence that the private sector could pro- vide these important services at higher quality and lower costs. • The stagnation cost. Government spending inhibits innovation. Because of competition and the desire to increase income and wealth, individuals and entities in the private sector constantly search for new options and opportunities. Government programs, however, are inherently inflexible. The common-sense notion that government spending retards economic performance is bolstered by cross-country comparisons and academic research. International comparisons are especially useful. Government spending consumes almost half of Europe’s economic output—a full one-third higher than the burden of government in the U.S. This excessive government is associated with sub-par economic performance: • Per capita economic output in the U.S. in 2003 was $37,600—more than 40 percent higher than the $26,600 average for EU–15 nations. • Real economic growth in the U.S. over the past 10 years (3.2 percent average annual growth) has been more than 50 percent faster than EU–15 growth during the same period (2.1 percent). • Job creation is much stronger in the U.S., and the U.S. unemployment rate is significantly lower than the EU–15’s unemployment rate. • Living standards in the EU are equivalent to living standards in the poorest American states—roughly equal to Arkansas and Montana and only slightly ahead of West Virginia and Mississippi, the two poorest states. The global evidence is augmented by dozens of academic research papers. Using varying methodologies, academic experts have found a clear negative relationship between government spending and economic performance. For instance, a National Bureau of Economic Research paper found: “A reduction by one percentage point in the ratio of primary spending over GDP [gross domes- tic product] leads to an increase in investment by 0.16 percentage points of GDP on impact, and a cumulative increase by 0.50 after two years and 0.80 percentage points of GDP after five years.” According to a New Zealand Business Roundtable study, “An increase of 6 percentage points in government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, (from, say 10 percent to 16 percent) would tend to reduce the annual rate of growth of GDP by about 0.8 percent.” An International Monetary Fund study con- firmed that “Average growth for the preceding 5- year period...was higher in countries with small governments in both periods.” Even the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development admitted: Taxes and government expenditures affect growth both directly and indirectly through investment. An increase of about one percentage point in the tax pressure— e.g. two-thirds of what was observed over the past decade in the OECD sample— could be associated with a direct reduction of about 0.3 per cent in output per capita. If the investment effect is taken into account, the overall reduction would be about 0.6–0.7 per cent. This is just a sampling of the academic research presented in the main paper. While no single research paper should be viewed as definitive, given the difficulty of isolating the impact of one policy on overall economic performance, the cumulative findings certainly bolster the theoretical and real-world arguments in favor of smaller government. Government spending should be significantly reduced. It has grown far too quickly in recent years, and most of the new spending is for purposes other than homeland security and national defense. Combined with rising entitlement costs associated with the looming retirement of the baby-boom generation, America is heading in the wrong direction. To avoid becoming an uncompetitive European-style welfare state like France or Germany, the United States must adopt a responsible fiscal policy based on smaller government. Budgetary restraint should be viewed as an opportunity to make an economic virtue out of fiscal necessity. Simply stated, most government spending has a negative economic impact. To be sure, if government spends money in a productive way that generates a sufficiently high rate of return, the economy will benefit, but this is the exception rather than the rule. If the rate of return is below that of the private sector-as is much more common-then the growth rate will be slower than it otherwise would have been. There is overwhelming evidence that government spending is too high and that America's economy could grow much faster if the burden of government was reduced. The deficit is not the critical variable. The key is the size of government, not how it is financed. Taxes and deficits are both harmful, but the real problem is that government is taking money from the private sector and spending it in ways that are often counterproductive. The need to reduce spending would still exist-and be just as compelling-if the federal government had a budget surplus. Fiscal policy should focus on reducing the level of government spending, with particular emphasis on those programs that yield the lowest benefits and/or impose the highest costs. Controlling federal spending is particularly important because of globalization. Today, it is becoming increasingly easy for jobs and capital to migrate from one nation to another. This means that the reward for good policy is greater than ever before, but it also means that the penalty for bad policy is greater than ever before.

Economic downturns cause global wars

**Mead 9** — Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow at the CFR, Professor at Yale (Walter Russel, "What Doesn't Kill You Makes You Stronger," The New Republic)

So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

CP 1NC Shell

Text: The 50 states should substantially improve funding for port security.  
  
Giving authority to the states would maximize solvency – best way to fund and manage

Edwards 11

(Chris, director of tax policy studies at the Cato Institute, November 16, 2011, “Federal Infrastructure Investment,” http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/federal-infrastructure-investment)

The U.S. economy needs infrastructure, but state and local governments and the private sector are generally the best places to fund and manage it. The states should be the "laboratories of democracy" for infrastructure, and they should be able to innovate freely with new ways of financing and managing their roads, bridges, airports, seaports, and other facilities. It is true that — like the federal government — the states can make infrastructure mistakes. But at least state-level mistakes aren't automatically repeated across the country. If we ended federal involvement in high-speed rail, for example, California could continue to move ahead with its own system. Other states could wait and see how California's system was performing before putting their own taxpayers on the hook.

Port Terrorism Frontline

**1.** No technology or intent to detonate containers, and customs solves

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Christopher Dallimore, employed as a consultant at the TTA Europe GmbH. He specializes in the legal aspects of supply chain security measures as well as customs-related problems under European and international law, 08, [“Securing the Supply Chain: Does the Container Security Initiative Comply with WTO Law?,” Prof. Dr. Hans-Michael Wolffgang, Institut für Zoll- und Verbrauchsteuerrecht, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Deutschland, http://miami.uni-muenster.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-4781/diss\_dallimore.PDF] E. Liu

On the other hand, the complainant could argue that this evidence amounts to nothing more than circumstantial evidence.1636 There is no evidence that terrorists have used containers to carry out their attacks and, in any case, the difficulties in constructing a WMD together with the necessary detonation device make such an attack technically unfeasible.1637 Moreover, the possible effects of such a detonation are irrelevant in determining the existence of a threat because they do not refer to the capability of terrorists to smuggle a WMD into the United States by means of containers primed for detonation on arrival.1638 Prior to 9/11, the Congressional Research Service stated: “Many believe that while terrorist WMD attacks are possible, they are by no means inevitable. While some experts believe that a terrorist large-scale WMD attack is a low – probability, high-consequence scenario, most seem to agree that possible future attacks would take the form of hoaxes and small scale attacks with chemical and biological weapons or materials, using lowtech dissemination methods, such as contamination of food sources.”1639 The GAO has also stated that “to be considered a threat, a terrorist group must not only exist but also have the intention and capability to launch attacks.”1640 The United States has not proved either of these elements, a point which has also been recognized by the OECD.1641 The literature on WMDs makes clear that such weapons are complicated to construct and difficult to detonate reliably and accurately.1642 It is generally accepted that terrorist groups lack the technological ability to construct a dirty bomb capable of being detonated by remote control.1643 For example, research into smart containers has revealed the difficulties in tracking individual container movements1644 and the challenge of finding a nuclear bomb in a container has been compared to looking for a needle in a hay-stack.1645 Terrorists seeking to detonate a nuclear device hidden in a container would be confronted by the same problems. Even the latest satellite tracking equipment (needed to locate a container for detonation by remote control) is attached to the outside of a container and easily visible to customs officers.1646 Overall, the evidence put forward so far by in support of the threat of a radiological bomb does not prove, on the balance of probabilities, that terrorist groups have the required technical know-how to detonate a WMD or radiological bomb in container.1647 The improbability of a bomb transported by container also appears to be recognized by the Department of Homeland Security itself in its budget allocation for 2006 which did not include it in its list of plausible attack scenarios.1648 Hitherto, the United States has tended to rely on the technical possibility of constructing a device as well as the catastrophic damage that an MSI could cause.1649 The lack of hard evidence is compounded by the fact that during the five years that the CSI has been in operation, neither the stationing of U.S. Customs officers at foreign seaports nor the advance submission of the cargo manifest has revealed any interference with cargo containers attributable to terrorist groups.1650 Considering the comments of the Panel with regard to the burden of evidence in Argentine – Hides, it is unlikely to consider this evidence as substantiating the classification of maritime terrorism as an “emergency in international relations.”1651 Moreover, the lack of a scientific threat assessment may mean that the measures are not proportional to the actual risk and not take into account the needs of commerce as required by statute.1652

2. Realm of fiction – Maritime attacks are improbable – Copycats, unfarmiliarity, and lack of skills

Lehr, lecturer in terrorism studies at the CSTPV, School of International Relations, 09

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Generally, all these efforts are laudable attempts in increasing both maritime safety and security. However, this fl urry of activities in the wake of 9/11 has also resulted in the emergence of a new kind of maritime terrorism industry, where scaremongers seem to be in the lead, for a variety of reasons, which are not discussed here. This new variant of “terrorologists” are busily conjuring Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors, and Capabilities 57 up maritime versions of “ultraterrorism” or “megaterrorism,” resulting in what I like to call the “maritime terrorism nightmare charts.” Currently, the undisputed leader of the maritime terrorism nightmare charts, at least in the United States, is an attack with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) voyaging to its target not on the tip of a missile but hidden in a container on board of a large container ship. Number two on the list is the “fl oating bomb” scenario, that is, a hijacked liquefi ed petroleum gas (LPG) or liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) tanker driven into a major port and exploded there, with the intent of disrupting seaborne global trade. The number three position is currently held by the “momentum weapon” scenario, which revolves around a large ship such as an ultra-large crude carrier or a chemical tanker. In such a case, the terrorists would attempt to drive a large vessel into the harbor at high speed to ram either other ships with vulnerable cargoes or oil terminals and the like and then detonate the ship. Such a scenario has been developed, for example, for the port of Singapore—home of Southeast Asia’s largest oil refi neries.8 All of these maritime megaterrorism scenarios have one thing in common: they still firmly belong to the realm of fiction. As stated in the introduction, all these worst-case scenarios are ignored in this contribution. There are several reasons behind the decision to ignore the more dreadful scenarios. First of all, terrorists are copycats. They use tactics that worked for them or worked for other groups before, they adapt them to their own circumstances, honing their skills and then striking continuously. This is the way terrorist groups acted on the land and this is also the way terrorist groups acted against aviation. It is not very plausible to me that they should not attempt to do likewise at sea. Second, it is even less plausible that terrorist groups should go for a “maritime terrorist spectacular” without fi rst trying to get a certain degree of familiarity with this (for them) new environment. And third, it seems to be, for me at least, outright implausible that terrorists would be able to acquire and ship a nuclear weapon—except maybe a comparatively crude radiological dispersal device, also known as “dirty bomb”—into a port or develop the skills necessary to turn a hijacked LNG into a “fl oating bomb.” In a nutshell, even the most determined maritime terrorists have to face a steep learning curve when it comes to embarking on a terror campaign in a new environment, and for them, too, the motto should be “keep it simple …”

3. Scarce targets, lack of skills and practice, weather and lack of publicity make sea targets unappealing

Parfomak. Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy and Frittelli 07

Paul W. Parfomak. Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy and John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy, 1-9-07, [“Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities,” Congressional Research Service, [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf)] E. Liu

Other analysts believe future maritime attacks against the United States are relatively unlikely, especially in U.S. waters. Notwithstanding specific acts of terrorism in the past, such as the Cole bombing, they note that fewer than 1% of all global terrorist attacks since 1997 have involved maritime targets.118 Furthermore, international terrorists have attacked no maritime targets in U.S. territory since the anti-Castro attacks in 1976 despite their demonstrated ability to do so overseas.119 Analysts also argue that U.S. ports and waterways are increasingly well-protected against terrorists due to the ongoing security activities of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-295), protections added using DHS port security grants, and other U.S. maritime security measures.120 Classification issues may also influence differing perceptions of maritime terrorism risk since piracy unrelated to terrorism is common in Southeast Asia and may be conflated with terrorism in maritime security statistics.121 A key consideration in assessing the general likelihood of a maritime attack against the United States is the inherent operational difficulty in mounting such attacks, especially compared to land attacks which may alternatively satisfy terrorist objectives. One U.S. naval analyst has identified a number of specific challenges for terrorists in the maritime environment: ! Maritime targets are relatively more scarce than land targets; ! Surveillance at sea offers less cover and concealment than surveillance on land; ! Tides, currents, wind, sea state, visibility, and proximity to land must all be factored into a maritime terror operation; ! Maritime terror operations may require skills that are not quickly or easily acquired such as special training in navigation, coastal piloting, and ship handling; CRS-24 122 Captain James Pelkofski, U.S. Navy. “Before the Storm: al Qaeda's Coming Maritime Campaign.” Proceedings. U.S. Naval Institute. Vol. 132. No. 12. Dec. 2005. [http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles05/Pro12Pelkofski.html] 123 Ibid. ! Testing weapons and practicing attack techniques, hallmarks of Al Qaeda’s typically meticulous preparation, are harder and more difficult to conceal at sea than on land; ! The generally singular nature of maritime targets, the low probability of damage and casualties secondary to the intended target, and the problems associated with filming attacks at sea for terrorist publicity may also reduce the desirability of maritime targets.122 Given these challenges, it remains an open question how likely maritime attacks against the United States may be. In terms of the scenario framework in this report, although a successful attack on U.S. maritime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known international perpetrators such as Al Qaeda, tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere. It bears repeating, however, that maritime terror attacks against the U.S. have occurred and there is evidence they have been planned for the future, despite the operational challenges. The same naval analyst cited above calls for continued vigilance: Rather than develop a false sense of security based on the belief that inherent difficulties will limit maritime terrorism ... caution is warranted in light of al Qaeda’s adaptability, ingenuity, tenacity, and audacity. Successful development and application of maritime tactics, techniques, and procedures has already occurred within the terrorist community.123 It appears, therefore, that while maritime terrorist attacks against the United States may be more difficult to execute and, consequently, less likely to occur than other types of attacks, they remain a significant possibility and warrant continued policy attention.

4. Slows down the movement of containers – That hurts the economy

Keefer, Campbell Law Review, 2012 (Wendy, March 3rd, “Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain”, Campbell Law Review)

The only way wholly to ensure terrorists are unable to use containers to import weapons, other supplies or even would-be terrorists themselves is greater, indeed complete, physical inspection of incoming containers. Such inspections would need to be conducted prior to the carrying vessel's entry into U.S. waters. Searches of all entering containers - or even inspection of any statistically significant number of containers - is extremely impractical. The impracticality of large scale inspections is clear when one considers that even now only about 5% of containers entering United States ports are examined to identify their contents. Any large scale expansion of the number of containers examined - whether using non-intrusive imaging technology or involving an actual physical search - would be overly burdensome on global trade. Indeed, such security measures may themselves serve one of the potential terrorist goals by slowing maritime trade to an economically unacceptable level.64

5. Ports are resilient – Ports are designed to be interconnected and the number of them provides redundancy – Their examples of past maritime disruptions such as hurricanes only prove that US ports are capable of quickly recovering

6. Obama wouldn’t retaliate

Crowley 10 (Michael, Senior Editor – New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, The New Republic, 1-5, <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>)

As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

Trafficking Frontline

1. Trafficking Frontline Coast Guard actions now prevent terrorism and trafficking

Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice 10

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice, 10-22-10, [“Subject: Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record,” Government Accountability Office, www.uscg.mil/history/docs/GAOd11140r.pdf] E. Liu

Governmental agencies, both in the United States and abroad, have exercised several options to address the risks presented by small vessels. As we previously reported in April 2010, 2 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—including the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—and other entities are taking actions to reduce the risk from small vessels. These actions include the development of the Small Vessel Security Strategy, establishment of security zones in U.S. ports and waterways, and escorts of possible targets of waterborne improvised explosive devices. CBP and the Coast Guard also have other efforts under way to prevent small vessels from transporting weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, or narcotics from foreign countries into the United States. CBP’s Office of Air and Marine reports that it is using airborne assets such as four engine P3 Airborne Early Warning and Long Range Tracker aircraft and soon maritime reconnaissance versions of unmanned Predator drones, to detect smugglers’ vessels, including semisubmersibles, sailing to the United States. The Coast Guard and CBP’s Office of Air and Marine also report that they station patrol vessels along smuggling routes to intercept smugglers’ vessels before they reach U.S. shores. At the request of Chairman Bennie Thompson and Ranking Member Peter King of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, we are currently reviewing CBP’s Office of Air and Marine program and examining the agency’s use of its resources and expect to issue the results of this review next year. Outside of the United States, the government of Singapore began a program in 2007 called Harbour Craft Transponder System where all vessels not covered by the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (generally, this convention covers vessels 300 gross tons or more on an international voyage and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more) were required to install and operate transponders that broadcast their position. The program was implemented jointly by the Maritime and Port Authority, the Police Coast Guard and the Republic of Singapore Navy, and an estimated 2,800 small vessels were equipped when its operation commenced in 2007. User costs include the transponder device, which ranges in cost from approximately $700 to $730 plus applicable taxes, depending on whether the model is portable or fixed, and an annual operating cost of approximately $90.

2. Immigration policy has criminals deported to South America, causing widespread trafficking and drug trade

Cicero-Domínguez, graduate of the Matías Romero Institute for Diplomatic Studies in Mexico City, 05

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Since 1996, when Congress implemented the aforementioned immigration laws, more than 500,000 people have been rounded up and deported to more than 160 countries around the world.89 Under these laws, every non-citizen sentenced to a year or more in prison is subject to deportation, even if the sentence is suspended; deportable crimes can be anything from murder to petty theft. Furthermore, the law, which is retroactive, eliminated nearly all grounds for appeal.90 One thing the American government did not take into account in enacting this legislation and, more importantly, by not holding bilateral talks with the countries of origin (many of which already had structural problems in their systems of justice), is that the American criminal "culture of drugs and guns [that many carried] back to their native lands [would wreak] havoc in nations that receive them in substantial numbers."91 In 2003, the Associated Press (AP) carried out a six-month investigation into the impact of criminal deportees upon arrival in their home countries, finding that in some instances, the crime waves are overwhelming police.92 According to the AP report, eighty percent of the deportees are being sent to seven Caribbean and Latin American countries: Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. In these nations jobs are scarce and police resources limited. The AP report indicates, citing U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement sources, that Mexico has absorbed 340,000 of these deportees.93 Given this reality, the Mexican government needs to focus on the social development side of the equation. When, for example, formerly imprisoned Mexicans return to Mexico, they are virtually unemployable. In many instances they are sent to towns with which they are completely unfamiliar, and without money they are unable to make it home and are forced to find whatever jobs they can until they gather enough money to either return to the U.S. and risk jail, or decide what new lives they will have. In El Salvador and Mexico, for example, criminal deportees are greeted by charity workers (often belonging to Roman Catholic affiliated NGOs), given a sandwich and bus fare, and sent on their way.94 The report substantiates what many had suspected: that in order to "survive in what for most of them are unfamiliar surroundings, many [former inmates] turn to crime."95 Currently, the types of criminal deportees who most worry receiving countries are gang members. In Honduras and El Salvador, for example, Los Angeles street gangs with names like Mara Dieciocho (the 18th Street Gang) and Mara Salvatrucha (the 13th Street Gang) are competing for the drug trade, warring both with indigenous thugs and with one another.96 These sophisticated criminals are being sent to unsophisticated, unindustrialized societies where they overwhelm local authorities.97 Furthermore, over the last few years, gangs in general have more often engaged in trafficking activities, such as prostitution of minors, to supplement their income.98 Although the 1996 law was intended to reduce crime in the United States by deporting some of the people who commit it, large-scale deportations are a relatively new crime-prevention strategy.99 Nevertheless, officials in many of the receiving countries, considering that perhaps most criminal deportees were children when they first arrived in the U.S. and have no real connections to the countries of their birth, insist that "home" is not where the criminal aliens are going."100 A big problem with the law, as acknowledged by Rep. Lamar Smith, R-Texas, a primary author of the 1996 legislation, is that "too many eventually make their way back through America's porous borders."101 In Mexico, criminal deportees tend to remain in border towns where U.S. immigration agents drop them off. There, they await their chance to slip back into the United States. In the meantime, Mexican police say, some traffic in drugs and commit other crimes.102 In addition, the problem of returning former U.S. inmates has spread all the way from the tip of Central America to central Mexico. In 2004, police sources in Mexico City indicated that the Central American crime group known as Maras Salvatruchas (Maras) had grown and invaded Mexican territory. These gangs are integrated by young people, including adolescents from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, who, in their efforts to reach the United States, have remained in the Valley of Mexico due to lack of monetary resources.103 These young men are considered very dangerous and have engaged in many types of crime, including kidnappings and robberies in the Federal District and State of Mexico, with extreme violence as their trademark.104

3. Trafficking and coca growing are inevitable – The solvency of the aff is displaced into trafficking to other countries and through land or air routes – The aff is unable to improve security in those sectors

4. If they do prevent Coca cultivation, that’s bad because it displaces ecologically dangerous crops and ranching

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A high-value crop has the potential to relieve environmental pressure, as growers would obtain higher income whilst using less land. Cocaine is expensive, so surely coca growers have a huge income, right? Yes, but the standard of living of growers is low, increasing the need to exploit local resources and decreasing the resilience of these communities. Both the environment and the market play roles in determining this outcome. The regions where most coca is grown are not the ones that produce legal agricultural exports, such as coffee or flowers, and so these are not directly comparable. The export market for tropical commodities, such as bananas or oil palm, is restricted to a few large landholders. The cassava, plantains, legumes, or fruit that tropical smallholders grow is part of a subsistence economy or sold only at local markets. Even if there were comparable licit crops, the experience of Bolivia, another large coca producer, suggests there are few viable alternatives (Barrientos & Schug, 2006). Despite a multi-decade effort to reduce coca cultivation, the fight against this illicit crop is far from over in Bolivian lowlands. In Cochabamba, the adaptability of coca plants, low maintenance, high demand, high market security and low overall risks, make this crop more competitive than alternative crops such as pineapples, banana, passion fruit, palm heart and pepper. The initial investment for coca crops for 2002 was 4–24 times lower and employed a minimum of 18% and a maximum of 58% more workers than alternative crops in the region. Whilst the cost of coca amounted 230US$/ha and provided employment for 280 daily workers; bananas and pepper required greater investments (in order, 995 and 5435US$/ha) and employed fewer farmers (117 daily workers for the former and for the latter 215). Other disadvantages of these alternative crops in the global market versus coca include the demand for high quality products, the low relative prices, and the more intense competition with other producing countries. To summarize, in the ecological zones where most coca is grown in Colombia there is currently no other exportable commodity and smallholder alternatives involve either raising cattle (when enough land is available), or working as a hired hand in a larger farm. Cattle ranching as an economic alternative to coca poses its own set of environmental risks and economic challenges. A study from Amazonian Ecuador in the 1990s found that the most environmentally unsound farming system—conversion to extensive pasture—was precisely the one that provided a higher standard of living(Murphy,Bilsborrow,&Pichón,1997).Raising cattle provided more income to the richest local campesinos than other economic activities, such as timber extraction or growing lowland coffee, making it the preferred avenue to a better life. Strikingly, the proportion of land in pasture was positively correlated with household wealth and income, whereas the proportion of land in crops was negatively correlated. Technical assistance, prior experience, and a legal land title were all important determinants of affluence, as were better soils and closeness to the road. The picture that emerges is one where the most forest-consuming activity, cattle ranching, would require significant infrastructure investments and technical assistance to play the role that coca does in the Colombia’s forested frontier.

5. Fires, roads and agricultural demand undermine biodiversity now

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The speed and magnitude of current human pressures on forests are affecting forest resilience. Forests close to edges are vulnerable to elevated dessication, tree mortality (40), and fire impacts. Rain forests may become seasonally flammable in dry years, but without anthropogenic ignition sources fire is a rare occurrence. Hence, fire has been a weak evolutionary selective force, and as a result many tree species lack adaptations that allow them to survive even low-intensity fires (41). Fire use for land management is nearly ubiquitous in rural Amazonia. About 28% of the Brazilian Amazon faces incipient fire pressure, being within 10 km of a fire source (42). Logging and forest fragmentation also increase the flammability of forests by providing substantial combustion material, opening up the canopy and drying the understory and litter layer and greatly increasing the amount of dry fire-prone forest edge. This synergism between fragmentation and fire is becoming increasingly important, with 20,000 to 50,000 km2of new forest edge being created annually in Brazilian Amazonia alone (43). Once burnt, a forest becomes more vulnerable to further burns (44), loses many primary forest species, and decreases sharply in biomass (41). A tipping point may be reached when grasses can establish in the forest understory, providing a renewable source of fuel for repeated burns. In scenarios of increased drying, it is possible to see this logging, fragmentation, dessication, and repeated burning as a likely fate for many of Amazonia’s forests. The 2005 drought provides evidence of this in southwest Amazonia: Remote forests remained fairly unaffected, but there was substantial penetration of fires from agricultural areas into surrounding, temporarily flammable forests (45). Despite the very recent slowdown in deforestation rates, there is potential for extensive deforestation in Amazonia, as more roads (both official and unplanned) are built through its core and connect across to Pacific ports and as international demand for tropical timber, soybeans, and free-range beef continues to grow, particularly from rapidly expanding Asian economies (2, 46, 47). Existing pressures might be exacerbated by accelerating worldwide demand for biofuels. Current plans for infrastructure expansion and integration could reduce forest cover from 5.4 million km2(2001, 87% of original area) to 3.2 million km2(53%) by 2050 (2) (Fig. 2A). This exceeds the likely threshold for rainfall maintenance and would emit 32 ± 8 Pg of carbon. Deforestation will be more concentrated in the south and east, with >50% forest loss, and along the Andean piedmont, isolating the warming lowlands from potential biotic refuges in the cooler mountains (46). In this scenario, the northwestern Amazon is protected by its remoteness and wetness, but longer term, this region is also vulnerable to hydrocarbon exploration and oilpalm plantations that are suitable for wet climates and acidic soils and have already replaced many of Asia’s tropical rainforests (46). Drying of Amazonia, whether caused by local or global drivers, could greatly expand the area suitable for soy, cattle, and sugarcane, accelerating forest disappearance.

6. Disease doesn’t cause extinction – Transmission and survivors are inversely related

Leah R. Gerber, Associate Professor of Ecology, Evolution, and Environmental Sciences, 8-05, ["Exposing Extinction Risk Analysis to Pathogens: Is Disease Just Another Form of Density Dependence?,” Ecological Society of America, Jstor] Zheng

The density of it population is an important parameter for both PVA and host-pathogen theory. A fundamental principle of epidemiology is that the spread of an infectious disease through a population is a function of the density of both susceptible and infectious hosts. If infectious agents are supportable by the host species of conservation interest, the impact of a pathogen on a declining population is likely to decrease as the host population declines. A pathogen will spread when, on average, it is able to transmit to a susceptible host before an infected host dies or eliminates the infection (Kermack and McKendrick 1927, Anderson and May l99l). If the parasite affects the reproduction or mortality of its host, or the host is able to mount an immune response, the parasite population may eventually reduce the density of susceptible hosts to a level at which the rate of parasite increase is no longer positive. Most epidemiological models indicate that there is a host threshold density (or local population size) below which a parasite cannot invade, suggesting that rare or depleted species should be less subject to host-specific disease. This has implications for small, yet increasing, populations. For example, although endangered species at low density may be less susceptible to a disease outbreak, recovery to higher densities places them at increasing risk of future disease-related decline (e.g., southern sea otters; Gerber ct al. 2004). In the absence of stochastic factors (such as those modeled in PVA), and given the usual assumption of disease models that the chance that a susceptible host will become infected is proportional to the density of infected hosts (the mass action assumption) a host specific pathogen cannot drive its host to extinction (McCallum and Dobson 1995). Extinction in the absence of stochasticity is possible if alternate hosts (sometimes called reservoir hosts) relax the extent to which transmission depends on the density of the endangered host species.

7. Biodiversity doesn’t affect human life

Sedjo 0 (Roger, Sr. Fellow, Resources for the Future, Conserving Nature’s Biodiversity: insights from biology, ethics and economics, eds. Van Kooten, Bulte and Sinclair, 2000, p. 114, JM)

As a critical input into the existence of humans and of life on earth, biodiversity obviously has a very high value (at least to humans). But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather a question of “how much.” Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life (threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as societies argue over the appropriate amount and cost of national defense. As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human life, while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with market value pertaining to the marginal unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global system will continue to function without that species. Similarly, the value of a piece of biodiversity (e.g., 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible. The global ecosystem can function with “somewhat more” or “somewhat less” biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in recent times. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The “value question” is that of how valuable to the life support function are species at the margin. While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is probably unknowable. However, thus far, biodiversity losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the earth’s life support system, presumably due to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in the system. Through most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity. Thus, as in the water-diamond paradox, the value of the marginal unit of biodiversity appears to be very small.

Solvency Frontline

1. Grant funding is insufficient and doesn’t cover substantial maintenance and wage costs

Monteverde, Vice President, Government Relations for the American Association of Port Authorities 09

Susan Monteverde, Vice President, Government Relations for the American Association of Port Authorities, 9-14-09, [“How Can We Improve Transportation Security?,” National Journal, <http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/2009/09/how-can-we-improve-transportat.php>] E. Liu

While the federal government has made significant inroads in protecting our shores from entry of illicit cargo and those who wishing us harm, the lion’s share of the financial burden for protecting port facilities remains on the ports themselves. Since 9/11, Congress has appropriated more than $2 billion to pay for security equipment, infrastructure and training to help harden port facilities against terrorism. While this figure may seem large, it pales in comparison to the costs that ports and their private-sector partners have had to shoulder, such as the 25% cost-share match for security grants, together with the costs for long-term equipment operations and maintenance, and wages for security personnel, which aren’t covered by the grants The 25% cost-share for public agencies is a significant economic disincentive to make security enhancements and implement regional maritime security plans. In these tight economic times, the cost-share is an even greater problem as ports are cutting back in all areas to address economic shortfalls. The Port Security Grant program is one of the few DHS grant programs that require a cost-share. Transit grants, for example, are exempt from cost-share requirements. Both 2002 and 2006 maritime security acts provided that operation and maintenance costs are an allowable expense under the Port Security Grant program. However, DHS has narrowly interpreted this to only allow maintenance on a grant-funded project within the term of the grant; thereby limiting its usefulness. For example, under a three-year grant, it may take two years to install a camera system; therefore, the maintenance contract would only cover the final year of the grant. By clarifying that grant money can be used to purchase service contracts for maintenance agreements on past federal projects as well, the growing burden to maintain these projects can be more equally shared. Finally, DHS should allow grant funds to be used for security personnel costs, as provided in the 2002 and 2006 security bills. Doing so would mirror both the Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant programs. Ports should be allowed to hire new security personnel (e.g., staff for operations, emergency centers, planning and counterterrorism posts, etc.) for the term of the grant. Personnel costs should also be permitted to backfill salaries for approved training programs.

2. Cost-share requirements prevent ports from substituting regular funds for port funds

Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice 10

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice, 10-22-10, [“Subject: Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record,” Government Accountability Office, www.uscg.mil/history/docs/GAOd11140r.pdf] E. Liu

Matching contributions—also known as cost-share requirements—are a key factor for effective federal grants for two reasons. First, it is important that federal dollars are leveraged to ensure that federal grants supplement stakeholder (whether public or private) spending rather than serve as a substitute for stakeholder spending on grantfunded projects. If a grant program is not designed to encourage supplementation, other stakeholders may rely solely on federal funds and choose to use their own funds for other purposes, meaning that federal funds cannot be leveraged to the extent they otherwise could be. We reported in September 2003 that the inclusion of matching requirements is one method through which to encourage supplementation of federal grants.

**3. Status quo Cost share waivers work – empirically proven**

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

The cost-share requirement was waived for all applicants under the ARRA, fiscal year 2010, and fiscal year 2011 grant cycles. However, grant applicants may continue to submit cost-share waiver requests for new projects to be funded under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, fiscal year 2008, and fiscal year 2009 grant cycles--which were cost- share years--if money in their port area remains unused from those years. As shown earlier in table 8, about $110 million in PSGP funds awarded to Group I port areas from fiscal year 2007 through 2009-- years in which the cost-share was required--remains unused. As port areas solicit projects for these unused funds, some applicants may submit cost-share waiver requests as well. For example, one fiduciary agent from a Group 1 port area reported that her port area recently completed the field-review process to identify projects to fund using their unused fiscal year 2009 grant monies. As a result, the port area submitted 10 projects to FEMA for approval in October 2011, of which 8 projects include a cost-share waiver request.