Port Security Neg

Port Terrorism Frontline - 1

**1.** No technology or intent to detonate containers, and customs solves

Dallimore, employed as a consultant at the TTA Europe GmbH. He specializes in the legal aspects of supply chain security measures as well as customs-related problems under European and international law, 08

Christopher Dallimore, employed as a consultant at the TTA Europe GmbH. He specializes in the legal aspects of supply chain security measures as well as customs-related problems under European and international law, 08, [“Securing the Supply Chain: Does the Container Security Initiative Comply with WTO Law?,” Prof. Dr. Hans-Michael Wolffgang, Institut für Zoll- und Verbrauchsteuerrecht, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Deutschland, http://miami.uni-muenster.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-4781/diss\_dallimore.PDF] E. Liu

On the other hand, the complainant could argue that this evidence amounts to nothing more than circumstantial evidence.1636 There is no evidence that terrorists have used containers to carry out their attacks and, in any case, the difficulties in constructing a WMD together with the necessary detonation device make such an attack technically unfeasible.1637 Moreover, the possible effects of such a detonation are irrelevant in determining the existence of a threat because they do not refer to the capability of terrorists to smuggle a WMD into the United States by means of containers primed for detonation on arrival.1638 Prior to 9/11, the Congressional Research Service stated: “Many believe that while terrorist WMD attacks are possible, they are by no means inevitable. While some experts believe that a terrorist large-scale WMD attack is a low – probability, high-consequence scenario, most seem to agree that possible future attacks would take the form of hoaxes and small scale attacks with chemical and biological weapons or materials, using lowtech dissemination methods, such as contamination of food sources.”1639 The GAO has also stated that “to be considered a threat, a terrorist group must not only exist but also have the intention and capability to launch attacks.”1640 The United States has not proved either of these elements, a point which has also been recognized by the OECD.1641 The literature on WMDs makes clear that such weapons are complicated to construct and difficult to detonate reliably and accurately.1642 It is generally accepted that terrorist groups lack the technological ability to construct a dirty bomb capable of being detonated by remote control.1643 For example, research into smart containers has revealed the difficulties in tracking individual container movements1644 and the challenge of finding a nuclear bomb in a container has been compared to looking for a needle in a hay-stack.1645 Terrorists seeking to detonate a nuclear device hidden in a container would be confronted by the same problems. Even the latest satellite tracking equipment (needed to locate a container for detonation by remote control) is attached to the outside of a container and easily visible to customs officers.1646 Overall, the evidence put forward so far by in support of the threat of a radiological bomb does not prove, on the balance of probabilities, that terrorist groups have the required technical know-how to detonate a WMD or radiological bomb in container.1647 The improbability of a bomb transported by container also appears to be recognized by the Department of Homeland Security itself in its budget allocation for 2006 which did not include it in its list of plausible attack scenarios.1648 Hitherto, the United States has tended to rely on the technical possibility of constructing a device as well as the catastrophic damage that an MSI could cause.1649 The lack of hard evidence is compounded by the fact that during the five years that the CSI has been in operation, neither the stationing of U.S. Customs officers at foreign seaports nor the advance submission of the cargo manifest has revealed any interference with cargo containers attributable to terrorist groups.1650 Considering the comments of the Panel with regard to the burden of evidence in Argentine – Hides, it is unlikely to consider this evidence as substantiating the classification of maritime terrorism as an “emergency in international relations.”1651 Moreover, the lack of a scientific threat assessment may mean that the measures are not proportional to the actual risk and not take into account the needs of commerce as required by statute.1652

2. Realm of fiction – Maritime attacks are improbable – Copycats, unfarmiliarity, and lack of skills

Lehr, lecturer in terrorism studies at the CSTPV, School of International Relations, 09

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Generally, all these efforts are laudable attempts in increasing both maritime safety and security. However, this fl urry of activities in the wake of 9/11 has also resulted in the emergence of a new kind of maritime terrorism industry, where scaremongers seem to be in the lead, for a variety of reasons, which are not discussed here. This new variant of “terrorologists” are busily conjuring Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors, and Capabilities 57 up maritime versions of “ultraterrorism” or “megaterrorism,” resulting in what I like

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to call the “maritime terrorism nightmare charts.” Currently, the undisputed leader of the maritime terrorism nightmare charts, at least in the United States, is an attack with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) voyaging to its target not on the tip of a missile but hidden in a container on board of a large container ship. Number two on the list is the “fl oating bomb” scenario, that is, a hijacked liquefi ed petroleum gas (LPG) or liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) tanker driven into a major port and exploded there, with the intent of disrupting seaborne global trade. The number three position is currently held by the “momentum weapon” scenario, which revolves around a large ship such as an ultra-large crude carrier or a chemical tanker. In such a case, the terrorists would attempt to drive a large vessel into the harbor at high speed to ram either other ships with vulnerable cargoes or oil terminals and the like and then detonate the ship. Such a scenario has been developed, for example, for the port of Singapore—home of Southeast Asia’s largest oil refi neries.8 All of these maritime megaterrorism scenarios have one thing in common: they still firmly belong to the realm of fiction. As stated in the introduction, all these worst-case scenarios are ignored in this contribution. There are several reasons behind the decision to ignore the more dreadful scenarios. First of all, terrorists are copycats. They use tactics that worked for them or worked for other groups before, they adapt them to their own circumstances, honing their skills and then striking continuously. This is the way terrorist groups acted on the land and this is also the way terrorist groups acted against aviation. It is not very plausible to me that they should not attempt to do likewise at sea. Second, it is even less plausible that terrorist groups should go for a “maritime terrorist spectacular” without fi rst trying to get a certain degree of familiarity with this (for them) new environment. And third, it seems to be, for me at least, outright implausible that terrorists would be able to acquire and ship a nuclear weapon—except maybe a comparatively crude radiological dispersal device, also known as “dirty bomb”—into a port or develop the skills necessary to turn a hijacked LNG into a “fl oating bomb.” In a nutshell, even the most determined maritime terrorists have to face a steep learning curve when it comes to embarking on a terror campaign in a new environment, and for them, too, the motto should be “keep it simple …”

3. Scarce targets, lack of skills and practice, weather and lack of publicity make sea targets unappealing

Parfomak. Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy and Frittelli 07

Paul W. Parfomak. Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy and John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy, 1-9-07, [“Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities,” Congressional Research Service, [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf)] E. Liu

Other analysts believe future maritime attacks against the United States are relatively unlikely, especially in U.S. waters. Notwithstanding specific acts of terrorism in the past, such as the Cole bombing, they note that fewer than 1% of all global terrorist attacks since 1997 have involved maritime targets.118 Furthermore, international terrorists have attacked no maritime targets in U.S. territory since the anti-Castro attacks in 1976 despite their demonstrated ability to do so overseas.119 Analysts also argue that U.S. ports and waterways are increasingly well-protected against terrorists due to the ongoing security activities of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-295), protections added using DHS port security grants, and other U.S. maritime security measures.120 Classification issues may also influence differing perceptions of maritime terrorism risk since piracy unrelated to terrorism is common in Southeast Asia and may be conflated with terrorism in maritime security statistics.121 A key consideration in assessing the general likelihood of a maritime attack against the United States is the inherent operational difficulty in mounting such attacks, especially compared to land attacks which may alternatively satisfy terrorist objectives. One U.S. naval analyst has identified a number of specific challenges for terrorists in the maritime environment: ! Maritime targets are relatively more scarce than land targets; ! Surveillance at sea offers less cover and concealment than surveillance on land; ! Tides, currents, wind, sea state, visibility, and proximity to land must all be factored into a maritime terror operation; ! Maritime terror operations may require skills that are not quickly or easily acquired such as special training in navigation, coastal piloting, and ship handling; CRS-24 122 Captain James Pelkofski, U.S. Navy. “Before the Storm: al Qaeda's Coming Maritime Campaign.” Proceedings. U.S. Naval Institute. Vol. 132. No. 12. Dec. 2005. [http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles05/Pro12Pelkofski.html] 123 Ibid. ! Testing weapons and practicing attack techniques, hallmarks of Al Qaeda’s typically meticulous preparation, are harder and more difficult to conceal at sea than on land; ! The generally singular nature of maritime targets, the low probability of damage and casualties secondary to the intended target, and the problems associated with filming attacks at sea for terrorist publicity may also reduce the desirability of maritime targets.122 Given these challenges, it remains an open question how likely maritime attacks against the United States may be. In terms of the scenario framework in this report, although a successful attack on U.S. maritime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known international perpetrators such as Al Qaeda, tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere. It bears repeating, however, that maritime terror attacks against the U.S. have occurred and there is evidence they have been planned for the future, despite the operational challenges. The same naval analyst cited above calls for continued vigilance: Rather than develop a false sense of security based on the belief that inherent difficulties will limit maritime terrorism ... caution is warranted in light of al Qaeda’s adaptability, ingenuity, tenacity, and audacity. Successful development and application of maritime

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tactics, techniques, and procedures has already occurred within the terrorist community.123 It appears, therefore, that while maritime terrorist attacks against the United States may be more difficult to execute and, consequently, less likely to occur than other types of attacks, they remain a significant possibility and warrant continued policy attention.

4. Slows down the movement of containers – That hurts the economy

Keefer, Campbell Law Review, 2012 (Wendy, March 3rd, “Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain”, Campbell Law Review)

The only way wholly to ensure terrorists are unable to use containers to import weapons, other supplies or even would-be terrorists themselves is greater, indeed complete, physical inspection of incoming containers. Such inspections would need to be conducted prior to the carrying vessel's entry into U.S. waters. Searches of all entering containers - or even inspection of any statistically significant number of containers - is extremely impractical. The impracticality of large scale inspections is clear when one considers that even now only about 5% of containers entering United States ports are examined to identify their contents. Any large scale expansion of the number of containers examined - whether using non-intrusive imaging technology or involving an actual physical search - would be overly burdensome on global trade. Indeed, such security measures may themselves serve one of the potential terrorist goals by slowing maritime trade to an economically unacceptable level.64

5. Ports are resilient – Ports are designed to be interconnected and the number of them provides redundancy – Their examples of past maritime disruptions such as hurricanes only prove that US ports are capable of quickly recovering

6. Obama wouldn’t retaliate

Crowley 10 (Michael, Senior Editor – New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, The New Republic, 1-5, <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>)

As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

XTN #1 – Squo Solves Terrorism

1NC number 1 – Their evidence is circumstantial regarding terrorism and it’s too difficult to construct or use a WMD – The US has proved neither a real threat or intention to attack a port, and the detonation system would be obviously visible and removed by customs officials, that’s Dallimore 08

**Status quo scans solve nuclear terror threats**

Lee, contributor at Voice of America, 2011 (Elizabeth, “US Port Security Technology Evolving”, Voice of America News)

Millions of containers from around the world enter ports throughout the United States every year. The threat to U.S. national security at these ports have grown in the last decade and so has security. At a recent technology conference near Los Angeles, companies were able to show off their latest inventions in high tech security. At two of the busiest ports in the United States, thousands of containers come and go every day. John Holmes with the Port of Los Angeles says ten years ago security around here was not a priority. "Not even fences or lights or signs," said Holmes. "It was just [a] very open atmosphere where the big focus was moving cargo through." But everything changed after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. U.S. ports have become a potential target because most of the goods that come into the U.S. come by the ocean. "Every single container does get screened. Everything that comes off the ship goes through radiation detection equipment," added Holmes. The port of Los Angeles have different high tech devices that look for bombs, chemical and biological weapons. Michael McMullen with the Port of Long Beach says technology is a big component of security. "Most of the security that we do today is really done almost in a virtual state," McMullen noted. McMullen says there are underwater sonar sensors, high tech radars that detect every ship within 11 kilometers of the port and hundreds of cameras above ground. In a room filled with computers and video monitors of all sizes, security analysts can track everything that goes on in and around the port complex. The port has shared the technology with personnel from Latin America and Asia so they can learn how these high tech systems are integrated and apply them to their own port security. "Ports may all be a little bit different, but what we're trying to do is very similar," Holmes explained. To share information, John Holmes says the Port Los Angeles held a port security summit last year with countries that included China, Korea and Israel. Holmes says ports around the world are vulnerable, using the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India as an example. "In Mumbai, the attacks actually came from the water," Holmes added. Security experts say exchanging information will help them stay current with all the new high tech devices on the market. At a technology conference near Los Angeles, Fred Aldrich is trying to sell a container scanning system. It would go on a ship and scan stacks of containers before they reach land.

XTN #2 – No Maritime Terrorism

1NC number 2 is realm of fiction – There can be no severe maritime attacks – Crashing weapons, LNG explosions and WMD containers are all impossible – Terrorists prefer tested and proven methods and want to guarantee an attack will succeed – They also can’t get nuclear weapons and need to learn a lot to pull off a technological attack, that’s Lehr 09

No evidence for terrorist container attacks

Dallimore, employed as a consultant at the TTA Europe GmbH. He specializes in the legal aspects of supply chain security measures as well as customs-related problems under European and international law, 08

Christopher Dallimore, employed as a consultant at the TTA Europe GmbH. He specializes in the legal aspects of supply chain security measures as well as customs-related problems under European and international law, 08, [“Securing the Supply Chain: Does the Container Security Initiative Comply with WTO Law?,” Prof. Dr. Hans-Michael Wolffgang, Institut für Zoll- und Verbrauchsteuerrecht, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Deutschland, http://miami.uni-muenster.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-4781/diss\_dallimore.PDF] E. Liu

On the other hand, the complainant could argue that the threat presented by terrorists to maritime transportation does not amount to an emergency in international relations. The expression “in time of” proves that Article XXI (b) (iii) refers to an existing rather than a potential situation.1600 The fear that terrorists will use a container to deliver and detonate a dirty bomb is based on assumption and not scientific evidence.1601 Reference to available evidence suggests that the assumed risk of container terrorism does not amount to an emergency in international relations. Maritime terrorists are reported to have targeted a range of vessels, including cruisers, freight ships, military vessels and ferries since 1992 but these attacks have not used containers.1602 Incidents of maritime terrorism generally tend to be irregular small-scale attacks by a number of diverse terrorist groups1603 and those which have occurred since 9/11 do not indicate any increase in scale or sophistication.1604 This traditionally low threat level is reflected by the fact that the International Maritime Organization only introduced new legal measures to prevent maritime terrorism following 9/11.1605 There is also uncertainty as to the significance of containers in facilitating maritime terrorism. For example, there has not been any published judicial decision with regard to terrorism and the carriage of goods by sea1606 and since its introduction in 2002, the CSI has not resulted in any discovery of WMD.1607 It is also significant that container security does not feature in the measures taken by the IMO and WCO. The ISPS Code and related amendments to the SOLAS Convention introduced by the International Maritime Organization do not contain any provisions directly dealing with container security.1608 This is also the case with the WCO’s Framework of Standards which concentrates on security at the premises of importers and co-operation between customs authorities and does not refer to container security directly. Overall, despite a number of attacks on maritime transportation assets following 9/11 (e.g. the attack on the Limburg by a group affiliated with Al Qaeda), terrorist attacks on maritime transportation facilities remain sporadic and primitive. There is also no evidence that terrorists have used or are likely to use containers in carrying out their attacks. The risk of terrorist attacks on maritime transportation is largely based on an a priori assumption1609 and cannot be objectively classified as constituting an “emergency in international relations.”

XTN #3 – Terrorists Won’t Attack Seas - 1

1NC number 3 – Terrorists won’t attack maritime targets – They’ve accounted for fewer than 1% fo all attacks – Targets are limited, it’s hard to hide, bad weather can block success, it requires specialized skills, and the fact it’s difficult to train in the seas or publicize an attack means Al Qaeda and other organizations are unlikely to even try to attack, that’s Parfomak and Frittelli 07

Terrorists don’t want to attack ports – empirically proven, limited resources

Chalk ’8 (Peter, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States, RAND, 2008)

Historically, the world’s oceans have not been a major locus of terrorist activity. Indeed, according to the RAND Terrorism Database, strikes on maritime targets and assets have constituted only two percent of all international incidents over the last 30 years. To be sure, part of the reason for this relative paucity has to do with the fact that many terrorist organizations have neither been located near coastal regions nor possessed the means to extend their physical reach beyond purely local theaters. There are also several problems associated with carrying out waterborne strikes which have, at least historically, helped to oﬀset some of the tactical advantages associated with esoteric maritime environments outlined in Chapter Two. Most intrinsically, operating at sea requires terrorists to have mariner skills, access to appropriate assault and transport vehicles, the ability to mount and sustain operations from a non-land–based environment, and certain specialist capabilities (for example, surface and underwater demolition techniques). 1 Limited resources have traditionally prevented groups from accessing these options.

Basic countermeasures can prevent attacks and the most probable tactics aren’t dangerous

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Basically, all naval or maritime specialists dealing with maritime terrorism are convinced that, given Al-Qaeda’s propensity for patient and intricate preparation, a sustained maritime terrorism campaign in the near future seems to be highly likely.43 Not being so sure about that, it is argued in this chapter that even if such a campaign would be launched, the types of attack chosen by Al-Qaeda and affi liated groups as the most likely actors would be “high probability, low impact” variant strikes rather than “low probability, high impact” acts of maritime megaterrorism. It is plausible that terrorists embarking on a terror campaign in an unknown environment would draw on their existing capabilities and skills to minimize their risks instead of immediately going for a “maritime big bang.” Thus, working under the assumption that terrorists (a) are copycats and (b) have to make do with limited resources, this chapter examined maritime terror attacks both pre- and post-9/11 because these attacks can be seen as the shadow of the future: they already worked for terrorist actors, the special set of maritime expertise and skills is rather modest, and the attacks are comparatively cheap, especially with regard to the damage infl icted on the targets. If one takes a look at the statistics, seaborne suicide attacks (both successful and unsuccessful ones) against ships by ramming them with small vessels are the most frequent of all such known acts of maritime terrorism. Apart from frequent suicide attacks committed by the LTTE Sea Tigers against ships of the Sri Lankan Navy, there were several attempts to attack Western—usually United States—warships in the Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Strait of Gibraltar. So far, only one attempt was successful—the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, killing 17 sailors. All other attempts either misfi red like the attack on the USS The Sullivans in January 2000 due to technical problems or were prevented from taking place at all by successful counterterrorist operations such as the uncovering of a plot to attack Western ships in the Strait of Gibraltar by Moroccan law enforcement authorities. There was one suicide attack in November 2002 by members of the “Islamic Jihad” on a patrol boat of the Israeli Defence Force, which suffered only minor damage. There was also one successful suicide attack on Western commercial shipping, targeting the tanker Limburg in October 2002, and one unsuccessful attempt on two oil terminals in the Persian Gulf, ABOT and KAAOT, as described earlier. Very surprisingly, scuba diving attacks follow as the second most frequent type of maritime terrorist attacks: so far, there have been three confi rmed and at least two probable underwater attacks, as discussed earlier. Knowing that Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda-affi liated groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and the ASG have already been trying to acquire scuba diving expertise, we can expect this type of clandestine maritime terrorist attacks to be attempted in the near future. Successful or attempted nonsuicide bombing attacks relying on IEDs are the third most common method of attack, but only if one lumps together the Superferry 14 bombing, the failed attempt to bomb an oil refi nery in Singapore, and the Basra bombing attack on a British river

Continued below

**XTN #3 – Terrorists Won’t Attack Seas - 2**

Continued from above

patrol in one category. Nonlethal attacks such as ramming ships or sabotaging them in ports without injuring crew members or anybody else have been and should be treated as a category of its own. They are acts of ecological terrorism, so far restricted to one actor and one group of targets: on the one hand, the Sea Shepherds as actors, and on the other hand, whalers and trawlers involved in illegal fi shing or whaling operations. However, it can be expected that such acts of ecoterrorism will increase in frequency over the next couple of years, affecting other types of ships more and more. Vessels transporting hazardous cargoes such as nuclear waste or chemicals readily come to mind, and so do offshore installations such as oil rigs or mobile drilling platforms, especially so if they are intended for explorative drilling in the previously “pristine” Arctic or Antarctic waters. Acts of ecoterror Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors, and Capabilities 69 would probably continue to be conducted in such a fashion that nobody gets injured and that the environment does not get polluted, which points at attempts to sabotage vessels at anchor, ramming attacks or attempts of boarding/hijacking targeted vessels or oil rigs. It is noteworthy that all acts of maritime terrorism so far have been short-range attacks against ships moored in a port or against port facilities—the Seabourn Spirit attack being the only incident where a ship has come under attack more than 150 Nmi offshore. This brazen act of maritime piracy rather than terrorism will probably remain the proverbial exception confi rming the rule because maritime terrorists—again, so far—neither have the capability nor the inclination of launching attacks on the high seas, for a variety of reasons. Some acts of maritime terrorism could be prevented by taking the provisions of ISPS serious: acts of sabotage, for example, or acts of boarding/hijacking. Both categories of maritime terrorism could be prevented by a vigilant crew—that is, if there is not just a skeleton crew of a dozen or less persons on board to drive down operating costs. The bad news is, even the best ship’s security plans notwithstanding, there is not much commercial shipping could do to fend off suicide attacks launched by a determined actor. A targeted ship’s crew would rather be in the position of the master of the Limburg, seeing a dinghy approaching at high speed, and unable to do anything about it. Even if the targeted ship is not moored to any facility, it is unlikely that the offi cer of the watch could react in time to dodge a fast-moving small boat. Even the vaunted “sonic gun” would probably not be good enough to fend off such an attack—although it would be better than nothing. Also, there is nothing much shippers could do to prevent scuba diving attacks from happening: commercial ships are not equipped with any sonar system, and crews are nowadays so small that there are not enough sailors on board to constantly monitor pitch-black waters for traces of bubbles—in case the submarine attackers do not use rebreathers. Interestingly, sonar systems tailor-made to detect scuba diving attacks are already available, a few ports already have installed them, and the port of Colombo allegedly even used one to fend off a scuba diving attack. But because scuba diving attacks are usually perceived to be highly unlikely to ever happen, cash-strapped ports are not in a hurry to routinely install them—which may well turn out to be a costly mistake. The good news is, in case a commercial vessel is a high-value target such as an LNG carrier, a chemical tanker, an oil tanker, or a cruise ship, the likelihood is quite high that the port establishes an exclusion zone around it, patrolled by some maritime law enforcement agencies. They might even deploy a fl oating barrier to prevent suicide attacks from happening. Unfortunately, and that is bad news again, not all ports in all parts of the world will be that quick in addressing their security problems: signing up to the ISPS Code or CSI is one thing, implementing all the nice plans that look good on paper is another. Therefore, the only consolation that readers can get out of this contribution is that acts of maritime terror have been few and far between up to now, and that in all probability, the number of such attacks will not rise dramatically in the foreseeable future—there are simply too many targets at land that can be attacked with a high probability of success so that terrorist groups need not dabble in a territory that is unfamiliar to them. The chances are good that crew members can spend their entire professional life at sea without them or their ship ever being a victim of a maritime terrorist attack. This only leaves the odd act of piracy to worry about.

XTN #4 – Cargo Scan Bad

1NC 4 – The solvency of plan causes ports to be less efficient because imaging technology or searching would greatly slow down maritime exchange networks, which is the original intent of a terrorist attack, that’s Keefer 12

100% scan not feasible- cost too high, faulty tech, and viruses

Johnson, Writer for National Journal, 2012 (Fawn, may 9, “Post-9/11 at Ports: So Far, So Good”, National Journal, proquest)

There are still some outstanding issues. Cargo screening is nowhere near 100 percent and probably never will be, although the industry lingers under the threat that DHS will eventually mandate it and cause massive expenses and trade difficulties. DHS officials put the government costs of 100-percent screening at nearly $20 billion, and that's just to put the technology in place; those estimates don't take into account the private costs to the trade industry. Rep. Candice Miller, R-Mich., who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee's Border and Maritime Subcommittee, has acknowledged that those costs may be prohibitive. Port ID cards also are now in place, but the electronic readers that scan them are still being developed. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said earlier this year that the agency is close to issuing guidance on card readers that will allow the information to be read remotely by port-security professionals. If the readers work correctly, they will make it almost impossible for people who aren't cleared at ports to sneak through security. But early tests show they don't always work, and industry insiders worry that technological difficulties from weather or database viruses will cause the headaches that thus far have been avoided. "I think it's going to be a nightmare," Monteverde predicted. The ports' biggest government problem isn't so different from everyone else's troubles: They are squeezed by budget cuts. Federal grants for port security are slowly fading away. The administration sought a 59-percent cut in the program this year. The port industry counters that it is hanging on to grant money to purchase and install ID card readers but can't do so until DHS issues guidance. Unlike so many other conversations in Washington, these exchanges are friendly ones. DHS and Congress have shown a fair amount of patience with the transportation and security industries as they adapt to the post-9/11 era, mindful that trade relationships and the country's own fragile economy hang in the balance.

XTN #5 – Ports Resilient

1NC 5 – There is no logical reason why one terrorist attack would collapse the world economy – Even if it’s in a region that’s important for exchange, there is inevitably some redundancy in US ports – They’re designed to create an interdependent system

And, their evidence cites economic disruptions from hurricanes like Katrina to seaports – That proves that ports will recover and that the removal of even a few ports won’t greatly harm the economy

XTN #6 – Impact Defense

1NC 6 - Nuclear weapons are used case-by-case and not in response to any terrorist attacks – A real world assessment makes it clear that there is no incentive for any political leader to overreact, that’s Crowley 10

Won’t be public pressure to overreact

Mueller ‘5 (John, Professor of Political Science – Ohio State University, Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NB.PDF)

However, history clearly demonstrates that overreaction is not necessarily inevitable. Sometimes, in fact, leaders have been able to restrain their instinct to overreact. Even more important, restrained reaction--or even capitulation to terrorist acts--has often proved to be entirely acceptable politically. That is, there are many instances where leaders did nothing after a terrorist attack (or at least refrained from overreacting) and did not suffer politically or otherwise. Similarly, after an unacceptable loss of American lives in Somalia in 1993, Bill Clinton responded by withdrawing the troops without noticeable negative impact on his 1996 re-election bid. Although Clinton responded with (apparently counterproductive) military retaliations after the two U.S. embassies were bombed in Africa in 1998 as discussed earlier, his administration did not have a notable response to terrorist attacks on American targets in Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers) in 1996 or to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and these non-responses never caused it political pain. George W. Bush's response to the anthrax attacks of 2001 did include, as noted above, a costly and wasteful stocking-up of anthrax vaccine and enormous extra spending by the U.S. Post Office. However, beyond that, it was the same as Clinton's had been to the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the same as the one applied in Spain when terrorist bombed trains there in 2004 or in Britain after attacks in 2005: the dedicated application of police work to try to apprehend the perpetrators. This approach was politically acceptable even though the culprit in the anthrax case (unlike the other ones) has yet to be found. The demands for retaliation may be somewhat more problematic in the case of suicide terrorists since the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act are already dead, thus sometimes impelling a vengeful need to seek out other targets. Nonetheless, the attacks in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, and against the Cole were all suicidal, yet no direct retaliatory action was taken. Thus, despite short-term demands that some sort of action must be taken, experience suggests politicians can often successfully ride out this demand after the obligatory (and inexpensive) expressions of outrage are prominently issued.

Trafficking Frontline

1. Trafficking Frontline Coast Guard actions now prevent terrorism and trafficking

Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice 10

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice, 10-22-10, [“Subject: Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record,” Government Accountability Office, www.uscg.mil/history/docs/GAOd11140r.pdf] E. Liu

Governmental agencies, both in the United States and abroad, have exercised several options to address the risks presented by small vessels. As we previously reported in April 2010, 2 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—including the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—and other entities are taking actions to reduce the risk from small vessels. These actions include the development of the Small Vessel Security Strategy, establishment of security zones in U.S. ports and waterways, and escorts of possible targets of waterborne improvised explosive devices. CBP and the Coast Guard also have other efforts under way to prevent small vessels from transporting weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, or narcotics from foreign countries into the United States. CBP’s Office of Air and Marine reports that it is using airborne assets such as four engine P3 Airborne Early Warning and Long Range Tracker aircraft and soon maritime reconnaissance versions of unmanned Predator drones, to detect smugglers’ vessels, including semisubmersibles, sailing to the United States. The Coast Guard and CBP’s Office of Air and Marine also report that they station patrol vessels along smuggling routes to intercept smugglers’ vessels before they reach U.S. shores. At the request of Chairman Bennie Thompson and Ranking Member Peter King of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, we are currently reviewing CBP’s Office of Air and Marine program and examining the agency’s use of its resources and expect to issue the results of this review next year. Outside of the United States, the government of Singapore began a program in 2007 called Harbour Craft Transponder System where all vessels not covered by the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (generally, this convention covers vessels 300 gross tons or more on an international voyage and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more) were required to install and operate transponders that broadcast their position. The program was implemented jointly by the Maritime and Port Authority, the Police Coast Guard and the Republic of Singapore Navy, and an estimated 2,800 small vessels were equipped when its operation commenced in 2007. User costs include the transponder device, which ranges in cost from approximately $700 to $730 plus applicable taxes, depending on whether the model is portable or fixed, and an annual operating cost of approximately $90.

2. Immigration policy has criminals deported to South America, causing widespread trafficking and drug trade

Cicero-Domínguez, graduate of the Matías Romero Institute for Diplomatic Studies in Mexico City, 05

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Since 1996, when Congress implemented the aforementioned immigration laws, more than 500,000 people have been rounded up and deported to more than 160 countries around the world.89 Under these laws, every non-citizen sentenced to a year or more in prison is subject to deportation, even if the sentence is suspended; deportable crimes can be anything from murder to petty theft. Furthermore, the law, which is retroactive, eliminated nearly all grounds for appeal.90 One thing the American government did not take into account in enacting this legislation and, more importantly, by not holding bilateral talks with the countries of origin (many of which already had structural problems in their systems of justice), is that the American criminal "culture of drugs and guns [that many carried] back to their native lands [would wreak] havoc in nations that receive them in substantial numbers."91 In 2003, the Associated Press (AP) carried out a six-month investigation into the impact of criminal deportees upon arrival in their home countries, finding that in some instances, the crime waves are overwhelming police.92 According to the AP report, eighty percent of the deportees are being sent to seven Caribbean and Latin American countries: Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. In these nations jobs are scarce and police resources limited. The AP report indicates, citing U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement sources, that Mexico has absorbed 340,000 of these deportees.93 Given this reality, the Mexican government needs to focus on the social development side of the equation. When, for example, formerly imprisoned Mexicans return to Mexico, they are virtually unemployable. In many instances they are sent to towns with which they are completely unfamiliar, and without money they are unable to make it home and are forced to find whatever jobs they can until they gather enough money to either return to the U.S. and risk jail, or decide what new lives they will have. In El Salvador and Mexico, for example, criminal deportees are greeted by charity workers (often belonging to Roman Catholic affiliated NGOs), given a sandwich and bus fare, and sent on their way.94 The report substantiates what many had suspected: that in order to "survive in what for most of them are unfamiliar surroundings, many [former inmates] turn to crime."95 Currently, the types of criminal deportees who most worry

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Continued from above

receiving countries are gang members. In Honduras and El Salvador, for example, Los Angeles street gangs with names like Mara Dieciocho (the 18th Street Gang) and Mara Salvatrucha (the 13th Street Gang) are competing for the drug trade, warring both with indigenous thugs and with one another.96 These sophisticated criminals are being sent to unsophisticated, unindustrialized societies where they overwhelm local authorities.97 Furthermore, over the last few years, gangs in general have more often engaged in trafficking activities, such as prostitution of minors, to supplement their income.98 Although the 1996 law was intended to reduce crime in the United States by deporting some of the people who commit it, large-scale deportations are a relatively new crime-prevention strategy.99 Nevertheless, officials in many of the receiving countries, considering that perhaps most criminal deportees were children when they first arrived in the U.S. and have no real connections to the countries of their birth, insist that "home" is not where the criminal aliens are going."100 A big problem with the law, as acknowledged by Rep. Lamar Smith, R-Texas, a primary author of the 1996 legislation, is that "too many eventually make their way back through America's porous borders."101 In Mexico, criminal deportees tend to remain in border towns where U.S. immigration agents drop them off. There, they await their chance to slip back into the United States. In the meantime, Mexican police say, some traffic in drugs and commit other crimes.102 In addition, the problem of returning former U.S. inmates has spread all the way from the tip of Central America to central Mexico. In 2004, police sources in Mexico City indicated that the Central American crime group known as Maras Salvatruchas (Maras) had grown and invaded Mexican territory. These gangs are integrated by young people, including adolescents from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, who, in their efforts to reach the United States, have remained in the Valley of Mexico due to lack of monetary resources.103 These young men are considered very dangerous and have engaged in many types of crime, including kidnappings and robberies in the Federal District and State of Mexico, with extreme violence as their trademark.104

3. Trafficking and coca growing are inevitable – The solvency of the aff is displaced into trafficking to other countries and through land or air routes – The aff is unable to improve security in those sectors

4. If they do prevent Coca cultivation, that’s bad because it displaces ecologically dangerous crops and ranching

Liliana M. Dávalosa, aDepartment of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The Open University, et al., Adriana C. Bejaranob bDepartment of Environmental Health Sciences, University of South Carolina and H. Leonardo Correac, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 09, [“Disabusing cocaine: Pervasive myths and enduring realities of a globalised commodity,” International Journal of Drug Policy 20 (2009) 381–386, ScienceDirect] E. Liu

A high-value crop has the potential to relieve environmental pressure, as growers would obtain higher income whilst using less land. Cocaine is expensive, so surely coca growers have a huge income, right? Yes, but the standard of living of growers is low, increasing the need to exploit local resources and decreasing the resilience of these communities. Both the environment and the market play roles in determining this outcome. The regions where most coca is grown are not the ones that produce legal agricultural exports, such as coffee or flowers, and so these are not directly comparable. The export market for tropical commodities, such as bananas or oil palm, is restricted to a few large landholders. The cassava, plantains, legumes, or fruit that tropical smallholders grow is part of a subsistence economy or sold only at local markets. Even if there were comparable licit crops, the experience of Bolivia, another large coca producer, suggests there are few viable alternatives (Barrientos & Schug, 2006). Despite a multi-decade effort to reduce coca cultivation, the fight against this illicit crop is far from over in Bolivian lowlands. In Cochabamba, the adaptability of coca plants, low maintenance, high demand, high market security and low overall risks, make this crop more competitive than alternative crops such as pineapples, banana, passion fruit, palm heart and pepper. The initial investment for coca crops for 2002 was 4–24 times lower and employed a minimum of 18% and a maximum of 58% more workers than alternative crops in the region. Whilst the cost of coca amounted 230US$/ha and provided employment for 280 daily workers; bananas and pepper required greater investments (in order, 995 and 5435US$/ha) and employed fewer farmers (117 daily workers for the former and for the latter 215). Other disadvantages of these alternative crops in the global market versus coca include the demand for high quality products, the low relative prices, and the more intense competition with other producing countries. To summarize, in the ecological zones where most coca is grown in Colombia there is currently no other exportable commodity and smallholder alternatives involve either raising cattle (when enough land is available), or working as a hired hand in a larger farm. Cattle ranching as an economic alternative to coca poses its own set of environmental risks and economic challenges. A study from Amazonian Ecuador in the 1990s found that the most environmentally unsound farming system—conversion to extensive pasture—was precisely the one that provided a higher standard of living(Murphy,Bilsborrow,&Pichón,1997).Raising cattle provided more income to the richest local campesinos than other economic activities, such as timber extraction or growing lowland coffee, making it the preferred avenue to a better life. Strikingly, the proportion of land in pasture was positively correlated with household wealth and income, whereas the proportion of land in crops was

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negatively correlated. Technical assistance, prior experience, and a legal land title were all important determinants of affluence, as were better soils and closeness to the road. The picture that emerges is one where the most forest-consuming activity, cattle ranching, would require significant infrastructure investments and technical assistance to play the role that coca does in the Colombia’s forested frontier.

5. Fires, roads and agricultural demand undermine biodiversity now

Yadvinder Malhi, Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, et al., J. Timmons Roberts,1,2Richard A. Betts,3Timothy J. Killeen,4 Wenhong Li,5Carlos A. Nobre, 1-11-08, [“Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the Amazon,” SCIENCE VOL 319 11 JANUARY 2008, <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/319/5860/169.short>] E. Liu

The speed and magnitude of current human pressures on forests are affecting forest resilience. Forests close to edges are vulnerable to elevated dessication, tree mortality (40), and fire impacts. Rain forests may become seasonally flammable in dry years, but without anthropogenic ignition sources fire is a rare occurrence. Hence, fire has been a weak evolutionary selective force, and as a result many tree species lack adaptations that allow them to survive even low-intensity fires (41). Fire use for land management is nearly ubiquitous in rural Amazonia. About 28% of the Brazilian Amazon faces incipient fire pressure, being within 10 km of a fire source (42). Logging and forest fragmentation also increase the flammability of forests by providing substantial combustion material, opening up the canopy and drying the understory and litter layer and greatly increasing the amount of dry fire-prone forest edge. This synergism between fragmentation and fire is becoming increasingly important, with 20,000 to 50,000 km2of new forest edge being created annually in Brazilian Amazonia alone (43). Once burnt, a forest becomes more vulnerable to further burns (44), loses many primary forest species, and decreases sharply in biomass (41). A tipping point may be reached when grasses can establish in the forest understory, providing a renewable source of fuel for repeated burns. In scenarios of increased drying, it is possible to see this logging, fragmentation, dessication, and repeated burning as a likely fate for many of Amazonia’s forests. The 2005 drought provides evidence of this in southwest Amazonia: Remote forests remained fairly unaffected, but there was substantial penetration of fires from agricultural areas into surrounding, temporarily flammable forests (45). Despite the very recent slowdown in deforestation rates, there is potential for extensive deforestation in Amazonia, as more roads (both official and unplanned) are built through its core and connect across to Pacific ports and as international demand for tropical timber, soybeans, and free-range beef continues to grow, particularly from rapidly expanding Asian economies (2, 46, 47). Existing pressures might be exacerbated by accelerating worldwide demand for biofuels. Current plans for infrastructure expansion and integration could reduce forest cover from 5.4 million km2(2001, 87% of original area) to 3.2 million km2(53%) by 2050 (2) (Fig. 2A). This exceeds the likely threshold for rainfall maintenance and would emit 32 ± 8 Pg of carbon. Deforestation will be more concentrated in the south and east, with >50% forest loss, and along the Andean piedmont, isolating the warming lowlands from potential biotic refuges in the cooler mountains (46). In this scenario, the northwestern Amazon is protected by its remoteness and wetness, but longer term, this region is also vulnerable to hydrocarbon exploration and oilpalm plantations that are suitable for wet climates and acidic soils and have already replaced many of Asia’s tropical rainforests (46). Drying of Amazonia, whether caused by local or global drivers, could greatly expand the area suitable for soy, cattle, and sugarcane, accelerating forest disappearance.

6. Disease doesn’t cause extinction – Transmission and survivors are inversely related

Leah R. Gerber, Associate Professor of Ecology, Evolution, and Environmental Sciences, 8-05, ["Exposing Extinction Risk Analysis to Pathogens: Is Disease Just Another Form of Density Dependence?,” Ecological Society of America, Jstor] Zheng

The density of it population is an important parameter for both PVA and host-pathogen theory. A fundamental principle of epidemiology is that the spread of an infectious disease through a population is a function of the density of both susceptible and infectious hosts. If infectious agents are supportable by the host species of conservation interest, the impact of a pathogen on a declining population is likely to decrease as the host population declines. A pathogen will spread when, on average, it is able to transmit to a susceptible host before an infected host dies or eliminates the infection (Kermack and McKendrick 1927, Anderson and May l99l). If the parasite affects the reproduction or mortality of its host, or the host is able to mount an immune response, the parasite population may eventually reduce the density of susceptible hosts to a level at which the rate of parasite increase is no longer positive. Most epidemiological models indicate that there is a host threshold density (or local population size) below which a parasite cannot invade, suggesting that rare or depleted species should be less subject to host-specific disease. This has implications for small, yet increasing, populations. For example, although endangered species at low density may be less susceptible to a disease outbreak, recovery to higher densities places them at increasing risk of future disease-related decline (e.g., southern sea otters; Gerber ct al. 2004). In the absence of stochastic factors (such as those modeled in PVA), and given the usual assumption of disease models that the chance that a susceptible host will become infected is proportional to the density of infected hosts (the mass action assumption) a host specific pathogen cannot drive its host to extinction (McCallum and Dobson 1995). Extinction in the absence of stochasticity is possible if alternate hosts (sometimes called reservoir hosts) relax the extent to which transmission depends on the density of the endangered host species.

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7. Biodiversity doesn’t affect human life

Sedjo 0 (Roger, Sr. Fellow, Resources for the Future, Conserving Nature’s Biodiversity: insights from biology, ethics and economics, eds. Van Kooten, Bulte and Sinclair, 2000, p. 114, JM)

As a critical input into the existence of humans and of life on earth, biodiversity obviously has a very high value (at least to humans). But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather a question of “how much.” Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life (threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as societies argue over the appropriate amount and cost of national defense. As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human life, while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with market value pertaining to the marginal unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global system will continue to function without that species. Similarly, the value of a piece of biodiversity (e.g., 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible. The global ecosystem can function with “somewhat more” or “somewhat less” biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in recent times. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The “value question” is that of how valuable to the life support function are species at the margin. While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is probably unknowable. However, thus far, biodiversity losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the earth’s life support system, presumably due to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in the system. Through most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity. Thus, as in the water-diamond paradox, the value of the marginal unit of biodiversity appears to be very small.

XTN #1 – Squo Solves Trafficking

1NC 1 – Actions by the DHS and Coast Guard are reducing the risk of WMD, terrorism, and narcotics trade now – Airplanes are detecting their vehicles and patrol boats intersect crime boats before they even reach our ports, that’s Caldwell 10

Coast Guard ships are intersecting cocaine transfers and a large majority of undocumented migrants

Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice 10

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice, 10-22-10, [“Subject: Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record,” Government Accountability Office, www.uscg.mil/history/docs/GAOd11140r.pdf] E. Liu

Much of the seaborne smuggling of narcotics and undocumented migrants into the United States currently makes use of small vessels, such as high-speed “go fast” boats and semisubmersibles. While CBP and the Coast Guard are also taking actions to intercept smugglers at sea, their ability to prevent this smuggling is mixed. In its fiscal year 2009 performance report, the Coast Guard reported removing 15 percent of the cocaine being transported on noncommercial vessels bound for the United States in fiscal year 2009. Conversely, the Coast Guard reported that it interdicted approximately 84 percent of undocumented migrants who attempted to enter the United States via maritime routes in fiscal year 2009. CBP’s performance report did not include similar measures for maritime narcotic or migrant interdiction.

XTN #2 – Deportation

1NC 2 – Even if we catch criminals, their actions are inevitable because current immigration policy deports them back to their home country, which is often Central America – Lessons they learned in US crime are then implemented there, overwhelming police forces and creating new sources of drugs, trafficking and violence that will inevitably spill back over to the US, that’s Cicero-Dominguez 05

Traffickers deported to Central America continue to traffic humans

Cicero-Domínguez, graduate of the Matías Romero Institute for Diplomatic Studies in Mexico City, 05

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Over the last decade, the issue of human trafficking has become a global phenomenon of unforeseeable proportions. Every year, millions of people throughout the world migrate from their homelands into countries offering more attractive prospects for employment. Some seek family reunification and others search for a better life in countries with higher economic growth, hoping for better opportunities for their children. Migratory workers and their families, many of whom are undocumented, are systematic targets of discrimination, racism and xenophobia. They are often exploited, many times as victims of trafficking. In the American hemisphere, these vulnerable groups, many of whom are comprised of women and children, are easy targets for organized crime running smuggling and trafficking rings across the United States-Mexico border. Since the adoption of more stringent immigration rules in the United States which focus on criminal deportation, the Mexico-United States border region has become the stage of increased criminal activity of this sort. As a result of the unilateral deportation policies and the lack of preparation on the part of the receiving nations, Mexico and the Central American countries have experienced an unexpected influx of U.S.-trained criminals who, lacking programs to help them cope with their new environments, have continued their criminal activities, often engaging in human trafficking. Although there has been increased activism on the part of the Mexican authorities to address the issues of trafficking and smuggling, the Mexican legal framework remains largely untouched and hence limited in its crime-fighting scope and effectiveness. Despite the recent adoption of international protocols to fight human trafficking and increased law enforcement cooperation between the United States and Mexico, the perennial lack of economic growth in the Latin American region, coupled with historical migration patterns, have boosted an already booming industry for the illegal smuggling and trafficking of people. Civil society on both sides of the border remains largely uninvested in the issue and tends to confuse undocumented immigration, smuggling of immigrants and trafficking in human beings as a single issue. This article analyzes the issue of human trafficking and its connection with the issue of smuggling of migrants. The focus is to discuss how trafficking affects the U.S.-Mexico relationship when this cross-boundary transfer occurs and how current state practices address issues surrounding the phenomenon. It explores the existing legal framework in Mexico and analyzes U.S. reports regarding state practices to combat the trafficking of people. It discusses a variety of policies on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, such as the deportation of former criminals from the U.S., as well as their impact on the U.S.-Mexico human trafficking and migrant smuggling phenomenon. The paper reviews some positive developments and proposes a series of social and policy measures (primarily non-law enforcement oriented), to address the situation.

XTN #3 – Inevitable

1NC 3 – They can’t permanently solve any of their impacts just by protecting the US because traffickers will find new markets for people and drugs in foreign nations or smuggle across less secure land routes –

That means you should prefer the probability of the links of our Das and discount their try-or-die claims because even if the impact is large, the chance of solving is essentially zero

XTN #4 – Legal Shift Turn

1NC 4 – The only way they can prevent degradation of the rainforest is if they actually prevent coca cultivation – That solvency is actually turned because farmers will shift to cattle ranching and alternative crops that are less profitable and have to be cultivated in larger amounts, comparatively increasing the impact on rainforests, that’s Davalosa et al. 09

Collapses to the market causes shift to legal crops – That caused Ecuadorian deforestation

Liliana M. Dávalosa, aDepartment of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The Open University, et al., Adriana C. Bejaranob bDepartment of Environmental Health Sciences, University of South Carolina and H. Leonardo Correac, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 09, [“Disabusing cocaine: Pervasive myths and enduring realities of a globalised commodity,” International Journal of Drug Policy 20 (2009) 381–386, ScienceDirect] E. Liu

Despite the evidence, fragmentation from coca might be small compared to the impact from legal crops or cattle ranching if illicit crops suddenly ceased to be an option. Comparative deforestation analyses along the Ecuador–Colombia border suggest otherwise; coca is a catalyst for landscape change(Vi˜ na,Echavarria, & Rundquist, 2004). Between 1985 and 1996 rates of fragmentation in Colombia, where coca began to expand, almost trebled those of Ecuador. In Ecuador deforestation was linked solely to legal activities so these rates can be interpreted as a “background” rate of fragmentation, much lower than that in the dynamic Colombian frontier. Coca has produced much greater deforestation than can be accounted for by population growth and, although the study was limited to western Amazonia(Vi˜ naetal.,2004),these environmental effects are likely common to other areas of coca expansion.

XTN #5 – Decline Inevitable

1NC 5 – Human actions such as fires, logging, roads and agricultural demand for food, biofuel and timber are alternative causes for destruction of biodiversity in the Amazon – They damage species resilience and undermine habitats for the rainforest critters, that’s Malhi 08

Climate change destroys diversity now

Ian Thompson, senior biodiversity scientist at Canadian Forest Service, forest ecologist and wildlife scientist who has worked in boreal ecosystems for more than 30 years, represented Canada at numerous international forest science and policy initiatives, including the Convention on Biological Diversity, IPCC, IUFRO, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, and the North American Forest Commission. Recently he began work with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization on the development of criteria and indicators for assessing forest degradation , et al., Brendan Mackey (The Australian National University and The Fenner School of Environment and Society), Steven McNulty (USDA Forest Service), and Alex Mosseler (Canadian Forest Service), 09, [“Forest Resilience, Biodiversity, and Climate

Change. A synthesis of the biodiversity/resilience/stability relationship in forest ecosystems,” Secretariat of

the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal. Technical Series no. 43, 67 pages, [www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-43-en.pdf](http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-43-en.pdf)] E. Liu

Most evidence suggests that tropical forests may not be resilient to climate change over the long term, primarily owing to a predicted reduction in rainfall and increased drought (IPCC 2007, Malhi et al. 2009). In the short term, evidence suggests a positive effect of CO2 fertilization on tropical forest production as a result of present climate change (Boisvenue and Running 2006, Lewis et al. 2009), although importantly this has involved some changes in species composition, indicating resilience to current change. Future capacity of these forests to maintain this service is highly uncertain (Cramer et al. 2004) as a result of altered moisture regimes possibly leading to increased fire and drought (e.g., Malhi et al. 2009). Loss of tropical forests will have consequences for global hydrology, among other consequences of global relevance (Fischlin et al. 2009). There is considerable evidence that climate change may lead to large losses in biodiversity in all tropical forests (e.g. Bazzaz 1998, Miles et al. 2004, Possingham and Wilson 2005, Rull and VegasVilarrubia 2006, Fitzherbert et al. 2008, Malhi et al. 2008), with consequent effects on the flow of goods and services from these forests. This will be especially true for montane and cloud forests, owing to a lack of surrogate habitats for species, and where evidence of biodiversity loss has already accumulated (Bunker et al. 2005, Rull and Vegas-Vilarrubia 2006, Colwell 2008). Wilson and Agnew (1992) provided an example of permanent regime shift in tropical cloud forests following unsustainable harvesting that resulted in a negative feedback involving the needed condensation moisture for remaining trees to survive; climate drying would have an identical effect. Tropical forests are at a substantial risk for biodiversity loss under climate change for several reasons including disruptions to complex ecosystem dynamics, the high degree of specialization and narrow niches for many tropical species, and because climate change will exacerbate an already high rate of deforestation (Bazzaz 1998). Large-scale loss of biodiversity will have dramatic negative effects on carbon sequestration capacity by tropical forests (Cramer et al. 2004, Fischlin et al. 2009). 5.3.2 case-study: amazon rain forest The Amazon rain forest is an extensive forest system about as large as the United States occurring in eight South American countries. It contains many forest types, depending on soils, topography, and climate, but there is a large area of evergreen forest with little seasonality where 200-900 cm of rain falls annually. These forests are highly resilient to the chronic disturbances of herbivory and blowdown typical of the region (table 9). However, land-clearing and logging had reduced the original extent of the Amazon forest by 15% by 2003 (Soares-Filho et al. 2006). Recent occasional drought episodes have exacerbated the human impacts by increasing forest fires (Malhi et al. 2008). Climate change is predicted to have long-term effects on forest structure and function by changing the mortality and growth rates of trees and increase the frequency of disturbances, especially an increasing fire frequency under a drier climate regime (Malhi et al. 2008, Phillips et al. 2008). Increased carbon dioxide concentrations seem to be having a direct positive impact on the productivity and relative competitive success among tropical plant species (Baker et al. 2004, Malhi et al. 2009). Modelling global warming of >3°C, as expected in tropical areas, reduces the tropical forest sink by midcentury, and results in a net carbon source towards the end of this century (Scholze et al. 2006, Fischlin et al. 2009). The most likely impact of climate change on Amazon forests will be drought and the development of seasonality in the rainforest (Malhi et al. 2009, Phillips et al. 2009), although models are far from certain in their prediction of rainfall. The predicted decreased rainfall and ground moisture will increase the likelihood of fire and shift the rainforest into drier seasonal forest. This process has a positive feedback owing to the loss the rainforest canopy that otherwise tends to maintain regional moisture levels (Laurance and Williamson 2001). As a result, much of the rainforest will change states to drier and possibly more open forests, reducing habitats, lowering regional water supplies, and becoming a far less productive forest (Malhi et al. 2009, Cochrane and Barber 2009). Climate change will exacerbate the many negative effects of ongoing deforestation and forest loss (Laurance 1998, Cook and Vizy 2008, Cochrane and Barber 2009), and the forests will be considerably different than at present. 5.4 Summary among forest biomes All forest types will undergo some change as a result of altered climate conditions; some of these changes are already occurring but widespread change is expected over the next 50-100 years (e.g., Alcamo et al. 2007, Fischlin et al. 2009). From the case-studies, it is clear that some forests are considerably more

Continued Below

**XTN #5 – Decline Inevitable - 2**

Continued from above

vulnerable (less resilient) than others as a result of altered disturbance regimes that are predicted under climate change. This is especially the case for forests where previously rarely-seen disturbances will become more common, such as fire in rainforests. In some cases, even ecological resilience will be overcome and forests are expected to change states to non-forest or savannah (IPCC 2007), as has happened in many areas previously, such as the northern Sahara area of Africa (Kröpelin et al. 2008). In many cases, forests will change states, however, at least among most boreal and some temperate forests, ecological resilience is expected. In many tropical forests, however, many rainforests may become dry tropical forests with reduced carbon storage capacity (case-studies, Fischlin et al. 2009). The diversity in these tropical regions suggests that some form of forest will continue to exist even with severe disturbance, but that many of the functions will change owing to the lack of resilience and new states, in general, will produce considerably less goods and services while supporting less biodiversity than at present.

Oil development damages the Amazon – Will only increase

CLINTON N. JENKINS is a conservation ecologist at the Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences at Duke University, et al., Matt Finer is the staff ecologist at the Washington D.C.-based environmental organization Save America's Forests, 9-13-08, [“Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness, Biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples,” August 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 8, <http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0002932>] E. Liu

Oil exploration in the western Amazon started as early as the 1920s in Peru [14] and Ecuador [15], with a production boom arriving in the 1970s. The subsequent three decades have seen numerous large projects, such as several oil projects in the central Ecuadorian Amazon, the Urucu gas project in Brazil, and the Camisea gas project in Peru. Oil and gas development in the western Amazon has already caused major environmental and social impacts [16–19]. Direct impacts include deforestation for access roads, drilling platforms, and pipelines, and contamination from oil spills and wastewater discharges. The technologies of the 1970s-era oil operations caused widespread contamination in the northern Ecuadorian [20–21] and northern Peruvian Amazon [22–23]. Even the much newer Camisea pipeline, which began operations in the fall of 2004, had five major spills in its first 18 months of operation [24]. A 1990s-era oil operation experienced a major spill in Ecuador’s Yasunı ´ region as recently as January 2008 [25]. There are also PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 August 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 8 | e2932 direct impacts associated with seismic testing activities during the exploration phase of projects [17,26]. Indirect effects arise from the easy access to previously remote primary forest provided by new oil roads and pipeline routes, causing increased logging, hunting, and deforestation from human settlement [27–29]. For example, much of the extensive deforestation in the northern and central Ecuadorian Amazon followed colonization along the oil access roads [30–32]. Social impacts are also considerable. The national representative organizations of indigenous peoples in Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP) have opposed new oil and gas projects, citing the widespread contamination from previous and current oil projects [33–34]. In both countries, local residents and indigenous peoples have taken legal actions against U.S. oil companies for allegedly dumping billions of gallons of toxic waste into the forests [35–37]. Intense opposition from indigenous peoples has stopped exploration in two leased blocks in Ecuador (Blocks 23 and 24) for over seven years [38]. Deforestation and colonization following road building has affected the core territory of several indigenous groups in Ecuador. Oil and gas projects in the territories of indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation have become highly contentious. These peoples, so named due to their decision of avoiding contact with the outside world [11], inhabit remote parts of the western Amazon [11–13] and are extremely vulnerable because they lack resistance or immunity from outsiders’ diseases [39]. First contact results in high rates of morbidity and mortality, with mortality estimates ranging between a third and half of the population within the first several years [11]. The extent and intensity of oil and gas exploration and development in the western Amazon may soon increase rapidly. Information on the future of oil and gas activities across the entire region is limited. Here, we quantify and map the extent of current and proposed oil and gas activity across the western Amazon using information from government and news sources. We document how the oil and gas blocks overlap areas of peak biodiversity, protected areas, and indigenous territories. Finally, we discuss policy options that might mitigate the impacts.

XTN #6 – No Impact to Disease

1NC 6 – Diseases won’t cause extinction because as a disease kills people off, the rate of transmission will be decreased – That means that any disease deadly enough to wipe populations out would quickly be unable to find enough hosts to sustain itself and burn out, that’s Gerber 05.

Lethal diseases burn out fast, pandemic is unlikely

Stephen Morse, director of the Center for Public Helth Preparedness, at the Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University, 04, [“Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: A Global Problem", ActionBioscience.org, http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/morse.html] Zheng

Morse: A pandemic is a very big epidemic. It requires a number of things. There are many infections that get introduced from time to time in the human population and, like Ebola, burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or they don’t have a way to get from person to person. They are a terrible tragedy, but also, in a sense, it is a lucky thing that they don’t have an efficient means of transmission. In some cases, we may inadvertently create pathways to allow transmission of infections that may be poorly transmissible, for example, spreading HIV through needle sharing, the blood supply, and, of course, initially through the commercial sex trade. The disease is not easily transmitted, but we provided, without realizing it, means for it to spread. It is now pandemic in spite of its relatively inefficient transmission. We also get complacent and do not take steps to prevent its spread.

XTN #7 – No Impact to Biodiversity

1NC 7 – Species biodiversity is unrelated to human survival because global ecosystems will fill in for the niches of lost species – Marginal and individual habitats have little effect on the global life support system which is very resilient – Past instances of lower biodiversity prove, that’s Sedjo 00

Species extinction is massive now – Disproves a brink

IPS, 8-19-09, [“Earth's Life Support Systems Failing,” Stephen Leahy, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48844>] E. Liu

The world has failed to slow the accelerating extinction crisis despite 17 years of national and international efforts since the great hopes raised at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The last big promise to act was in 2003, when government ministers from 123 countries committed to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010. Experts convening an international meeting in South Africa this week agree that target will not be met next year, which is also the International Year of Biodiversity. "It is hard to imagine a more important priority than protecting the ecosystem services underpinned by biodiversity," said Georgina Mace of Imperial College in London, and vice chair of the international DIVERSITAS programme, a broad science-based collaborative. "We will certainly miss the target for reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010," said Mace in a statement. Biodiversity is not just weird-looking animals and pretty birds. It is the diversity of life on Earth that comprises the ecosystems that provide vital services, including climate regulation, food, fibre, clean water and air. By some estimates, 12,000 species go extinct every year, and the rate is accelerating. Akin to a cataclysmic asteroid, pollution, logging, over-exploitation, consumption, land use changes and engineering projects have produced the planet's sixth great extinction of species. Freshwater ecosystems may be the first collapse of one of Earth's life support systems in 13,000 years. Species that live in lakes and rivers are vanishing four to six times faster than anywhere else on the planet, said Klement Tockner of the Leibniz-Institute of Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries in Germany. "There is clear and growing scientific evidence that we are on the verge of a major freshwater biodiversity crisis," Tockner told IPS. Some experts predict that by 2025, not a single Chinese river will reach the sea, except during floods, with tremendous effects on coastal fisheries in China. Worldwide, all 25 species of sturgeon and all species of the river dolphins are either extinct or facing extinction. The species remaining in the world's great rivers like the Danube, Rhine, Hudson and Mekong are mostly non-native species, Tockner said. "This is a complete change, and few are aware of the threat," he added. Freshwater ecosystems cover only 0.8 percent of the planet's surface, but they contain roughly 10 percent of all animals, including more than 35 percent of all vertebrates. The pace of extinctions is quickening, Tockner warns - especially in hot spot areas around the Mediterranean, in Central America, China and throughout Southeast Asia. "Our priority must be to conserve the last free flowing river systems...there are very few left," he said. And many have new dams proposed to generate carbon-free electricity. Ironically, freshwater ecosystems do a better job at keeping carbon out of the atmosphere as they absorb and bury about seven percent of the carbon humans add annually to the atmosphere. "Scientists are alarmed at how fact things are unraveling," said Hal Mooney, an environmental biologist from Stanford University in California and the chair of DIVERSITAS, which is convening its Second Open Science Conference Oct. 13-16 with 600 experts from around the world. "There is a real sense of urgency, but not amongst policy-makers," Mooney told IPS from Nairobi, Kenya last week. Mooney and others had been meeting with government officials from 95 countries in Nairobi to try and create an Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services - not unlike the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The idea is to bridge the enormous divide between biodiversity science and policy and be able to provide science-based guidelines for policy-makers. Many policy decisions, even green ones, are made without regard to impacts on biodiversity, said Anne Larigauderie, executive director of the Paris-based DIVERSITAS. For example, government policies that encourage and subsidise the use of biofuels and biomass energy to reduce carbon emissions have largely gone forward with little investigation into the potential impacts on ecosystems. "Such policy decisions reveal a fragmented view of the world," Larigauderie told IPS in an interview in Geneva last August. While major decisions about the fate of the climate will be made at the Copenhagen climate treaty negotiations in December, those involved know little about biodiversity. Some carbon reduction programmes carried out poorly, such as the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), could be a disaster for biodiversity and make climate change worse, she said. "Climate change impacts biodiversity and vice versa," Larigauderie said. However, governments are not yet ready to integrate or mainstream biodiversity concerns into their daily decision-making. After four and half years of talking about an IPCC-like organisation for biodiversity, they failed to agree in Nairobi, said Mooney. "It will be at least another year... There is a mismatch between speeds of ecosystem decline and political decision-making," he said. And without such an organisation, there is little possibility the accelerating decline in species will slow. As with climate, governments need to firmly commit to binding targets, but no specific biodiversity protection targets are likely for some years. "If we already had created IPBES (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Service) the world would have new science-based targets in place," said Mooney. "We're hoping that missing the 2010 target to stem the rate of biodiversity loss will create the momentum to get governments to create IPBES."

**XTN #7 – No Impact to Biodiversity - 2**

Extinctions are high as a proportion of species too

New Scientist, 2-24-10, [“Earth's nine life-support systems: Biodiversity,” Fred Pearce, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18574-earths-nine-lifesupport-systems-biodiversity.html>] E. Liu

Boundary: Annual species extinction rate no more than 10 per million per year Current level: At least 100 per million per year Diagnosis: Boundary far exceeded Humans are driving species to extinction by ploughing up or paving over their habitats, by introducing alien species like rats and weeds, by poisoning them with pollution, by hunting them for food and, increasingly, by changing the climate. Individual species may not matter much on their own, but collectively they form ecosystems that provide a range of vital "ecosystem services", such as recycling waste, cleaning water, absorbing carbon and maintaining the chemistry of the oceans. Although we know that high levels of biodiversity are essential to healthy ecosystems, it is not yet clear how much can be lost before ecosystems collapse, nor which species are the key players in a given ecosystem. So Rockström's team settled on crude extinction rates as the best "interim indicator" of the state of ecosystems. They put the current extinction rate at more than 100 extinctions per million species per year, and rising. That compares with a natural "background" extinction rate of around 0.3. Up to 30 per cent of all mammal, bird and amphibian species will be threatened with extinction this century. This cannot go on safely. Current rates may even mirror those of the "big five" mass extinctions of the past half-billion years, including the meteorite strike that did for the dinosaurs. While the world carried on after those events, it was massively transformed. To avoid a repeat, they suggest a safe long-term annual extinction rate of no more than 10 per million species per year. By that measure, they say, "humanity has already entered deep into a danger zone... if the current extinction rate is sustained".

Solvency Frontline

1. Grant funding is insufficient and doesn’t cover substantial maintenance and wage costs

Monteverde, Vice President, Government Relations for the American Association of Port Authorities 09

Susan Monteverde, Vice President, Government Relations for the American Association of Port Authorities, 9-14-09, [“How Can We Improve Transportation Security?,” National Journal, <http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/2009/09/how-can-we-improve-transportat.php>] E. Liu

While the federal government has made significant inroads in protecting our shores from entry of illicit cargo and those who wishing us harm, the lion’s share of the financial burden for protecting port facilities remains on the ports themselves. Since 9/11, Congress has appropriated more than $2 billion to pay for security equipment, infrastructure and training to help harden port facilities against terrorism. While this figure may seem large, it pales in comparison to the costs that ports and their private-sector partners have had to shoulder, such as the 25% cost-share match for security grants, together with the costs for long-term equipment operations and maintenance, and wages for security personnel, which aren’t covered by the grants The 25% cost-share for public agencies is a significant economic disincentive to make security enhancements and implement regional maritime security plans. In these tight economic times, the cost-share is an even greater problem as ports are cutting back in all areas to address economic shortfalls. The Port Security Grant program is one of the few DHS grant programs that require a cost-share. Transit grants, for example, are exempt from cost-share requirements. Both 2002 and 2006 maritime security acts provided that operation and maintenance costs are an allowable expense under the Port Security Grant program. However, DHS has narrowly interpreted this to only allow maintenance on a grant-funded project within the term of the grant; thereby limiting its usefulness. For example, under a three-year grant, it may take two years to install a camera system; therefore, the maintenance contract would only cover the final year of the grant. By clarifying that grant money can be used to purchase service contracts for maintenance agreements on past federal projects as well, the growing burden to maintain these projects can be more equally shared. Finally, DHS should allow grant funds to be used for security personnel costs, as provided in the 2002 and 2006 security bills. Doing so would mirror both the Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant programs. Ports should be allowed to hire new security personnel (e.g., staff for operations, emergency centers, planning and counterterrorism posts, etc.) for the term of the grant. Personnel costs should also be permitted to backfill salaries for approved training programs.

2. Cost-share requirements prevent ports from substituting regular funds for port funds

Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice 10

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice, 10-22-10, [“Subject: Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record,” Government Accountability Office, www.uscg.mil/history/docs/GAOd11140r.pdf] E. Liu

Matching contributions—also known as cost-share requirements—are a key factor for effective federal grants for two reasons. First, it is important that federal dollars are leveraged to ensure that federal grants supplement stakeholder (whether public or private) spending rather than serve as a substitute for stakeholder spending on grantfunded projects. If a grant program is not designed to encourage supplementation, other stakeholders may rely solely on federal funds and choose to use their own funds for other purposes, meaning that federal funds cannot be leveraged to the extent they otherwise could be. We reported in September 2003 that the inclusion of matching requirements is one method through which to encourage supplementation of federal grants.

**3. Status quo Cost share waivers work – empirically proven**

United States Government Accountability Office November 2011 (The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, “Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be

Strengthened” http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt)

The cost-share requirement was waived for all applicants under the ARRA, fiscal year 2010, and fiscal year 2011 grant cycles. However, grant applicants may continue to submit cost-share waiver requests for new projects to be funded under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, fiscal year 2008, and fiscal year 2009 grant cycles--which were cost- share years--if money in their port area remains unused from those years. As shown earlier in table 8, about $110 million in PSGP funds awarded to Group I port areas from fiscal year 2007 through 2009-- years in which the cost-share was required--remains unused. As port areas solicit projects for these unused funds, some applicants may submit cost-share waiver requests as well. For example, one fiduciary agent from a Group 1 port area reported that her port area recently completed the field-review process to identify projects to fund using their unused fiscal year 2009 grant monies. As a result, the port area submitted 10 projects to FEMA for approval in October 2011, of which 8 projects include a cost-share waiver request.

XTN #1 – Not Enough

Port grants are being reduced now and can’t pay for basic programs

Erickson, SIA Director of Government Relations, 12

Don Erickson, SIA Director of Government Relations, leading trade group for businesses in the electronic and physical security market, 12, [“Port Security Fact Sheet,” SIA, <http://www.siaonline.org/content.aspx?id=718>] E. Liu

The Port Security Grant Program was established in 2001 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide funds dedicated for ports to strengthen security and comply with new federal mandates. This program provides a solution to ports so as to offset the expensive cost of purchasing equipment to comply with the new federal mandates. For example, Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) card readers that would thoroughly enhance port security would cost ports more than $370 million according to a study done by the International Biometrics and Identification Association (IBIA). A cost that although considerably low given the advanced technology used, would be hard for ports to find the necessary capital to support. Ports already have a financial hardship when it comes to security according to the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). For this reason and recognizing that an attack on our ports would cause great loss of life, damage our energy supplies and infrastructure and hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces, Congress passed the 2006 "Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port" Act. This legislation authorized $400 million annually for ﬁve years for port security grants. Grant awards may be used for a variety of purposes including the acquisition of fencing, CCTV and digital video devices, access control systems, explosive device mitigation equipment, radiological or chemical detection devices and identity management solutions. The Security Industry Association (SIA) has worked with AAPA and key members of Congress to build awareness of the challenges facing ports and the need for increased federal funds. As a result of these efforts put forth by all involved, Congress approved $320 million in FY 2007 and the full funding level of $400 million was included in the FY 2008 Omnibus Appropriations Bill. In FY 2009, President Obama requested $210 million for the PSGP. Fortunately, Congress allocated $300 million for this program as part of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act that was signed into law on October 28, 2009. That legislation also included a waiver of the cost-share requirement as a condition of receiving PSGP funds, thus incentivizing ports to apply for these critical grant funds. However, the funds made available for the PSGP continue to decrease placing a greater burden on ports. In FY 2011 only $235 million was allocated for the PSGP program. Despite the difficulties that ports are facing in the area of security, in 2011 legislation was introduced by Senator Susan M. Collins (R-ME) to reauthorize the SAFE Ports Act. The bill, known as the “SAFE Port Reauthorization Act” would authorize appropriations to continue a grant program for port security.

XTN #2 – Cost-Share Good

1NC 2 – Cost-share requierments are good because they prevent ports from using federal funds to substitute for things they were already buying – That substitution means that there’s no new investment in security measures and federal funds are irrelevant, that’s Caldwell 10

Even some of this argument takes out the advantage – Any ports that can freely claim funds won’t increase their investments, creating vulnerable parts of the national network that are independently susceptible to trafficking and terrorism

XTN #3 – Not Bad Now

1NC 3 – Cost-share doesn’t block applications – In 2011, 10 projects were applied for, and 8 included waivers – The funds they claim are unused are inevitably rewarded, that’s GAO 11